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The need for both usable and secure authentication is more pronounced than 
ever before. Security researchers and professionals will need to have a deep 
understanding of human factors to address these issues. Due to their ubiquity, 
recoverability, and low barrier of entry, passwords remain the most common means of 
digital authentication. However, fundamental human nature dictates that it is 
exceedingly difficult for people to generate secure passwords on their own. System-
generated random passwords can be secure but are often unusable, which is why most 
passwords are still created by humans. We developed a simple system for automatically 
generating mnemonic phrases and supporting mnemonic images for randomly 
generated passwords. We found that study participants remembered their passwords 
significantly better using our system than with existing systems. To combat shoulder 
surfing – looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as he or she enters sensitive input such 
as passwords – we developed an input masking technique that was demonstrated to 
minimize the threat of shoulder surfing attacks while improving the usability of 
password entry over existing methods. We extended this previous work to support 
longer passphrases with increased security and evaluated the effectiveness of our new 
system against traditional passphrases. We found that our system exhibited greater 
memorability, increased usability and overall rankings, and maintained or improved 
upon the security of the traditional passphrase systems. Adopting our passphrase 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
One of the predominant themes in computer security lies in authentication: 
addressing how to grant access to authorized users while preventing access to others. 
Modern widespread adoption and reliance on computer systems, and online services in 
particular, only strengthens the importance of this goal. The traditional focus in 
computer security has been on hardening the computer systems themselves, but many 
successful attacks have targeted the human component (Tognazzini, 2005). This 
suggests a need for security researchers and professionals who possess a strong 
background in human factors and usability. 
A fundamental issue with digital authentication is the balance between security 
and usability. As designers increase the level of difficulty of an authentication process in 
order to reduce the frequency of unwanted users gaining access (misses), the 
occurrence of legitimate users being denied access (false alarms) likewise increases. The 
way to reduce both types of errors is to design systems that better differentiate 
between authorized and unauthorized users; this is accomplished by exploiting any 
differences between these two groups of users (Tognazzini, 2005). 
Although the significant cost of poor security has been extensively covered, 
considerably less attention has traditionally been paid to the cost of poor usability in 




decrease in worker productivity, returning customers, or organizational reputation can 
often be expected. However, the fact that poor usability can also indirectly lead to 
decreased security is often overlooked (Tognazzini, 2005). 
People can be quite adaptable when the situation demands it. Since our desire 
to maintain the highest possible level of security is trumped by our desire to get things 
done quickly and easily, we routinely come up with workarounds that sacrifice security 
for usability. This is why, for example, users often reuse passwords across multiple 
accounts, write passwords down, or share passwords with others (Sasse & Flechais, 
2005). 
The challenge in improving existing systems thus results from maximizing the 
security benefits while simultaneously limiting the usability regressions. This is what 
much of the previous research has focused on – when usability has even been 
considered at all. Alternately, we can maximize usability improvements while minimizing 
security degradations. Sometimes, it may even be possible to improve both. 
The purpose of this research is to apply human factors and usability design to 
advance the progress of digital authentication. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant 
topics, starting with an overview of digital authentication and passwords in particular, 
including a section covering important technical topics in password theory. Mnemonics, 
as they relate to the field of usable security, are covered, as well as input masking and 




how they differ from passwords, before summarizing how the integration of these 
usable security techniques can provide advantages beyond the individual components. 
Chapters 3-5 describe novel work done to improve on the usability and security 
of existing digital authentication practices. Chapter 3 details the addition of a new 
system of mnemonic phrases and user-created pictures to aid in the retention of 
system-generated passwords. Chapter 4 expands on the work from the previous chapter 
by examining the effects of different methods of creating those mnemonic pictures on 
usability and security. Chapter 5 examines different input masking techniques to combat 
shoulder surfing during digital authentication, including a novel method intended to 
match the usability benefits of cleartext and the security benefits of masked text. 
Chapter 6 describes a study that integrates the work from Chapters 3-5 with 
passphrases to help facilitate a transition from passwords to passphrases. The 
implementation of the new system is detailed in the process. The impetus for a 
transition to passphrases is increased security, but usability must also be carefully 
considered for this change to be successful. The results indicate that the innovations 
from Chapters 3-5 combine particularly effectively with passphrases to address their 
major shortcomings. 
Chapter 7 concludes by framing the research inside the bigger picture of the field 
of digital authentication. First, the main contributions of the research to the field are 
summarized. Recommendations and applications are also covered. Finally, Chapter 7 




rapidly evolving subject area, and even the best solutions to existing problems must 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Digital Authentication 
Users can be authenticated by what they know or recognize, what they hold, or 
what they are (Renaud, 2005). With the first category, the user and system agree upon a 
shared secret during account creation, and the system tests if the user knows the secret 
during authentication. This secret is typically in the form of a password. The second 
category relies on physical or electronic tokens, while the third category, commonly 
known as biometrics, identifies humans by their individual traits or characteristics. 
Tokens and biometrics have seen increased usage in recent years, but they have 
severe issues that have limited their adoption (Renaud, 2005). Hardware tokens are 
more expensive, can be unwieldy to transport and use (especially in multiples), and can 
easily be lost or stolen. Software tokens, implemented using public encryption keys and 
private decryption keys, are difficult for the majority of users to understand (Whitten & 
Tygar, 1999), only work with one particular machine, and are less secure than hardware 
tokens. Biometrics depend on a strictly controlled environment, can often be forged 
(e.g., by using a photograph to defeat face recognition), and are susceptible to lockout 
caused by changes in traits of legitimate users. 
A significant drawback with tokens and biometrics is the difficulty in recovering 
from user lockout; in comparison, a password can be reset immediately, usually by the 
system itself upon request. Because of these combined factors, passwords remain by far 




passwords is due to their widespread availability and understandability, traits that 
should not change any time in the near future (Herley & van Oorschot, 2012). 
Passwords 
The process of authentication can always be improved, so researchers and 
practitioners have been trying to replace password authentication for decades, on the 
grounds of poor usability, security, or both. While passwords have the potential to be 
extremely secure, the cognitive demand of having to remember a unique password for 
each account often causes users to choose weak passwords or reuse them, drastically 
lowering security (Renaud, 2005). 
For those who argue that passwords tend to be dangerously insecure, one of the 
primary reasons given is that users predominantly create their own passwords. Users 
typically prefer to create their own passwords, but user-generated passwords have been 
shown to be much less secure than randomly generated passwords created by 
computer systems (Proctor, Lien, Vu, Schultz, & Salvendy, 2002). 
Many password strengthening techniques have been implemented or suggested, 
such as password restrictions, periodic forced rotation of passwords, substitution of 
special characters for letters, per-site password modifications, and guidelines like 
creating a phrase and using the first letter of each word to form a password. These 
degrade usability but commonly do not lead to any appreciable improvement in security 




Moving beyond the ubiquitous textual passwords, many researchers have sought 
to develop graphical passwords also based on secrets. These rely either on recall – the 
same as almost all text-based passwords – or recognition, usually implemented as a 
series of prompts that must all be answered correctly to authenticate (Stobert & Biddle, 
2013). The series of prompts is necessary to increase the total number of possible 
graphical passwords for security purposes. More research focus has been placed on 
recognition-based graphical passwords because the nature of displaying pictures lends 
itself to recognition tasks. 
Graphical passwords based on recognition have been shown to be more usable 
than those based on recall (Stobert & Biddle, 2013) – incidentally, the same was not 
found to apply to textual passwords (Wright, Patrick, & Biddle, 2012). However, even 
using series of prompts, the number of possible passwords in typical implementations 
remains relatively low. Passfaces, the canonical example of a graphical password 
(Wright et al., 2012), asks users to select the appropriate face out of nine choices, thrice. 
Both types of graphical passwords are especially susceptible to the human 
tendency of predictability, whether selecting more attractive faces, clicking on hotspots 
in an image, or drawing familiar shapes (Suo, Zhu, & Owen, 2005). As graphical 
passwords cannot be disguised without a tremendous hit to usability, they are also 
particularly vulnerable to attackers who observe the act of authentication – a threat 
known as shoulder surfing. Graphical passwords tend to increase login time significantly 




practical, daily use. Finally, there is a relative difficulty in deploying graphical passwords 
with existing password systems. Due to these issues, graphical passwords have not 
caught on in commercial systems, other than in contexts such as smartphones and 
screensavers where they often substituted for previously having no password at all. 
Technical Topics in Password Theory 
An increasingly popular suggestion made by security professionals is to utilize 
password managers (Gaw & Felten, 2006), which allow a user to have one master 
password that unlocks many other passwords for individual websites and applications. 
Password managers are usually integrated with automatic form fillers so that users need 
not even sign in to websites manually. Ideally, the use of password managers should 
result in an increase in both usability and security. In terms of usability, the user is freed 
from the heavy burden of having to remember dozens of passwords for different 
accounts. Because the individual passwords can now all be long, complex, randomly 
generated, and unique – thus bypassing the perils of password reuse across accounts, 
where the compromise of one account leads to the compromise of many – security is 
likewise improved (Gaw & Felten, 2006). 
Despite the seemingly superior nature of password managers, few users actually 
employ them. One key reason why this is true is the important issue of trust (Karole, 
Saxena, & Christin, 2010). Online password managers have proven to be the most 
usable (Karole et al., 2010), but they are also the least likely to be trusted, due to 




something goes wrong. They worry that their master password being stolen will lead to 
all of their accounts being compromised; this is true, but no different from the popular 
single sign-on (SSO) model or losing an e-mail account that can then reset the passwords 
of all of the other accounts. 
For many users, the hassle and uncertainty make setting up a password manager 
not worth it. Even out of the people who do use password managers, most of them do 
not use them in conjunction with more complex passwords (Gaw & Felten, 2006), thus 
deriving only a usability benefit and no security benefit. Regardless of the future 
adoption of password managers or single sign-on, users would still require one truly 
secure master password – which they have largely proven unable to create – so security 
researchers and professionals would not find their jobs made any easier. 
When discussing password security, a fundamental question is if online or offline 
attacks are being considered. Because websites can limit the number of repeated login 
attempts made by one IP address or for one account, the required level of security for 
online attacks tends to be much lower. 
Almost all of the newsworthy security breaches in the headlines are instead 
cases where the web server is compromised and the attackers can download and attack 
the passwords offline. When the passwords are stored on a server simply as cleartext, 
which is rare but does still happen, all of those passwords are instantly stolen. 
The minimal line of defense is hashing the passwords on the server. A hash 




into a small, fixed output. For example, if someone wants to check if the large file he or 
she downloaded is uncorrupted, it would be best to simply check the published hash for 
that file to see if it matches. Because they were designed for this type of use, the vast 
majority of hash functions are designed to operate as quickly as possible (while also 
satisfying other mathematical properties). 
Hashing is important to password storage because the hashes can be stored and 
the passwords themselves discarded (Teat & Peltsverger, 2011). When a user tries to log 
in using a password, the server simply runs the hash function again on the password and 
checks if the hash matches. Although an attacker can’t work backwards to derive a 
password from a hash, he or she can make guesses at the password, run the same hash 
function (which is easily determined), and see if the result matches the stolen hash. 
Offline, with no lockouts based on the number of failed attempts, the attacker can keep 
going as long as he or she wishes. As computing power increases, the number of 
attempts that can be made per second also rises. 
To make things even more efficient, an attacker can pre-compute hashes from 
many inputs, which can be stored and loaded into memory. This is a classic time-
memory tradeoff, and a common implementation as it relates to passwords is called a 
rainbow table (Avoine, Junod, & Oechslin, 2008). 
These attacks are defeated by a process called salting, whereby a random (but 
not necessarily secret) piece of data is stored for each account. The salt is passed to the 




(but still consistent) hash for that account. This makes it infeasible for rainbow tables to 
pre-compute all of these new hashes (Teat & Peltsverger, 2011), as common password 
input now becomes uncommon input. 
There is one specific idea in the field of password theory, known as key 
stretching (Percival, 2009) – hardly ever considered by any of the numerous alarmist 
articles about massive password leaks – which renders calculations of how long it would 
take to crack a certain password even more inaccurate. Hash functions are generally 
designed to work quickly, and in fact most passwords today are hashed on web servers, 
unsalted, using MD5, an extremely fast hash function from 1992. The reports of billions 
of passwords being tested per second are calculated under these ideal conditions. 
There also exist a set of hash functions that are designed specifically to protect 
passwords; they take an exceptionally large amount of computation to complete and 
even allow parameters to be specified that roughly control how long they take through 
repeated hashes. The most prevalent security-focused hash functions are PBKDF2, 
bcrypt, and scrypt (Percival, 2009). If a legitimate user must wait an additional 50 
milliseconds to be authenticated, this is essentially transparent, but it means an attacker 
could only make at most 20 attempts per second. 
Key stretching is not a panacea for password security. Weak passwords that are 
easily guessed will still be easy to crack, and impractically strong passwords wouldn’t 
have been cracked anyway, but for the many passwords that fall somewhere in the 




From a practical standpoint, it means that passwords should try to be strong enough to 
reach that range where they need to be attacked by brute force instead of heuristics. If 
nothing else, key stretching serves as a reminder that like most aspects of computer 
security, the battle between users and attackers is like an escalating game of tug of war 
where both sides adapt – but we certainly aren’t doomed to lose. 
Mnemonics for Passwords 
The fundamental issue with all types of user-generated passwords is that 
humans are not random creatures. We behave in patterns, and we remember 
information more readily when some sort of order is imposed. This very fact makes that 
information easier to guess. Of course, the disorder of randomly generated passwords 
makes them hard for people to use. But instead of starting with a nonrandom phrase 
and working backwards to form a nonrandom password, we can instead begin with a 
random password and then generate a mnemonic phrase to better remember it. For 
instance, rather than deriving jajwuth from the well-known Jack and Jill went up the hill, 
which results in a weaker password, the randomly generated jpwjaop can instead be 
converted to Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas. 
This mnemonic phrase can be created by either the user (Scarfone & Souppaya, 
2009) or the system. Taking a random password and converting it to a phrase can prove 
quite difficult and time-consuming for users, suggesting a potential advantage for 




Previous attempts at generating mnemonic phrases automatically, such as a 
fairly complex system by Jeyaraman and Topkara (2005), have focused on linguistic 
techniques such as natural language processing and personalized corpuses. However, 
the produced mnemonics, such as Basotho orthoper, shoots dais, toes Yakut hack from 
bosdtyh, have not been found to be usable or memorable. 
Since the translation from randomly generated password to mnemonic phrase is 
only to aid the user’s memory, and the phrase itself is not used in authentication, there 
is no change in security. Therefore, a simple solution imposing maximum order (e.g., 
converting bosdtyh to Barbara’s other squirrel definitely took your hotcakes) should 
work best. The effectiveness of the system could be further enhanced by utilizing a 
mnemonic picture, which Nelson and Vu (2010) showed to improve the memorability of 
user-generated passwords. 
Goverover, Basso, Wood, Chiaravalloti, and DeLuca (2011) found that combining 
multiple recall strategies often improves memorability by more than any single strategy 
can alone. In the context of password recall, we can utilize multiple mnemonic 
strategies simultaneously, including cues, the generation effect, and the self-reference 
effect.  
Cues have been shown to enhance the recall of items with which they are 
associated (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). In this context, we can employ user-created 
pictures to help cue the recall of phrases to bolster password recall. Cues that are more 




information tend to be the most effective (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Hence, pictures 
that contain more information should more effectively cue password recall than 
pictures that hold less information do. However, if the pictures contain too much 
information about the authentication secret or are too strongly associated with the 
phrase (Mäntylä, 1986), attackers will have an easier time decoding the pictures. 
But pictures need not contain large amounts of generalizable information in 
order to be strongly associated with a target item for a given person. The generation 
effect demonstrates that creating cues oneself rather than simply combining pieces of 
information together can additionally increase recall (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Because 
the generation effect works only for the person who created the artifact, users who 
design their own pictures should benefit from improved password recall (Bertsch, Pesta, 
Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007), yet the chances of an attacker finding the password should 
not increase. 
More specifically, creating pictures through the process of drawing may increase 
the benefits of the generation effect over simply using online images. With drawings, 
users generate the entire picture rather than merely linking images together in the 
process of compilation. Furthermore, drawing images may incite the self-reference 
effect: the enhancement of recall when referring to the self (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 
1977). This is because the very nature of drawing an image may often be more personal 





Even if the underlying authentication systems have been designed and 
implemented properly, the very act of authentication itself can also be a soft spot for 
unauthorized users to attack. One such method, known as shoulder surfing, entails 
looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as he or she enters critical electronic input such 
as a password or credit card number. Different techniques are employed to hide 
sensitive input, such as the common practice of replacing entered text with bullets. Such 
techniques increase security but inevitably degrade the usability of the process by 
making it harder for the user to see what he or she is entering. 
Even bullet-masked input may not be enough to stop determined attackers. 
Although looking at the screen is easier whenever possible, shoulder surfers can still 
look at a user’s keyboard. In fact, they can also employ hidden cameras, keyloggers, or 
other devices to capture what is being typed without the need to be physically present 
(Wiedenbeck, Waters, Sobrado, & Birget, 2006). 
The response by many researchers to this situation has been to design systems 
with increased resistance to shoulder surfing but a marked decrease in usability. 
Complicated schemes have been implemented based on ideas such as convex hull clicks 
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), probabilistic cognitive trapdoor games (Roth, Richter, & 
Freidinger, 2004), and cued gaze points (Forget, Chiasson, & Biddle, 2010). 
It has been argued that bullet masking is not secure enough to warrant the cost 




recommended on his website that most passwords should be displayed as cleartext 
instead of bullet-masked due to usability concerns (2009). While the usability of bullet-
masked input could be improved, there are obvious security concerns with simply 
showing passwords as cleartext. 
Because of the low level of planning, equipment, or technological sophistication 
required of the attacker (Hoanca & Mock, 2005), shoulder surfing is widely available as a 
form of attack. This greatly increases the pool of would-be assailants beyond merely the 
domain of dedicated experts. 
Passphrases 
The idea of a passphrase can be seen as an extension to the traditional 
passwords used in digital authentication. They fulfill the same role as a secret that the 
user demonstrates to the system that he or she knows in order to prove personal 
identity. Therefore, like passwords but unlike other proposed replacements for 
passwords such as tokens or biometrics, passphrases should also prove to be easy to 
implement, easy for users to understand, and easy for users to recover from lockout. 
The fundamental feature of passphrases is that they are longer than passwords. 
The primary motivation for this change is to increase the level of security, particularly 
against brute-force attacks, which occur when an automated attack is conducted not by 
making informed guesses but by exhaustively trying all the possible permutations in a 
given password space (Herley & van Oorschot, 2012). As the price for large quantities of 




attacks more viable, there is renewed interest in moving from shorter passwords to 
longer passphrases – not to use as mnemonics but as the actual secret texts themselves 
(Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 2006). 
From a human factors standpoint, the key benefit of passphrases is that they 
allow the secret to be much less complex, and thus more memorable, while still 
maintaining or increasing security. Using a dataset of 12,000 actual passwords, Kelley et 
al. found that a password policy of “anything at least 16 characters long” was much 
stronger than any policy requiring at least 8 characters plus all the possible restrictions 
(e.g., character types, repeated characters, dictionary checks) commonly found today 
(2011). Likewise, Komanduri et al. found that the most effective combination of security 
and usability resulted from long passwords with no other restrictions (2011). 
In mathematical terms, by increasing the number of characters, the total number 
of bits of entropy – which can be thought of as the randomness, disorder, or security of 
a password – can be maintained while greatly lowering the number of bits of entropy 
per character. Randomly selected characters would produce the greatest amount of 
entropy (as each character is independent), while English-language phrases would 
exhibit far less (as the letter q would almost always be followed by u). 
According to guidelines from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) (Burr et al., 2006), the first character of an English-language phrase encapsulates 




entropy each, the next twelve characters represent 1.5 bits of entropy each, and every 
subsequent character adds 1 additional bit to the calculated entropy. 
To illustrate with a previous example, “Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas” 
(                                                           
                                                             ) would be 
stronger than even a randomly generated 7-character password using uppercase and 
lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols 
(                                                          ). When taking 
into account that user-created passwords exhibit far less security than system-
generated ones, the difference drastically increases. 
The first known mention of the idea of using a longer phrase in lieu of a 
traditional password comes from a paper by Sigmund Porter (1982). Just three years 
later, Kurzban created a system-generated passphrase system using words randomly 
chosen from a set of wordlists (1985). The resulting passphrases needed to be 
abbreviated since authentication systems of the day typically did not support passwords 
with double-digit length. 
This technical issue was a major reason why the use of passphrases did not catch 
on in the following years. But with the necessity of higher levels of security in recent 
years due to the vast increase in widely available computing power, as well as the 
steady obsolescence of legacy authentication systems (Keith, Shao, & Steinbart, 2007), 




Keith, Shao, and Steinbart tested the memorability of user-created passphrases 
and found that while the memorability of the passphrases themselves was no better or 
worse than that of passwords, login success rate was significantly lower because of a 
significant increase in typographical errors (2007). This finding suggests that combining 
passphrases with techniques that reduce errors made while entering passwords, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, could mitigate this effect. 
Around the same time, Kuo, Romanosky, and Cranor evaluated the security of 
user-created passphrases and found that the security benefit of this group of 
passphrases was lower than the security community expected (2006). This was because 
users frequently selected weak phrases based on topics such as lyrics, movies, literature, 
or television shows. This research recommended the possibility of using system-
generated passphrases, such as an extension of the system-generated phrases discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4, instead of user-created ones. 
One of the most popular recommendations in the online security community for 
creating system-generated passphrases is Arnold Reinhold’s Diceware (2012), first 
demonstrated in 1995. This system utilizes a wordlist containing 7,776 words – not all of 
which can be found in an English dictionary – and suggests that the user rolls five 
physical dice to determine each word in the passphrase; Reinhold recommends using 
five words in each passphrase (2012) for future-proof security. Observations among 




the years following its creation, and little research was initially conducted about the 
usability of the system. 
As a result, Leonhard and Venkatakrishnan (2007) tested the usability of 
Diceware passphrases containing three words each. They found that Diceware 
performed poorly, with users rating their satisfaction with their password at 1.71 out of 
5. Because the wordlist was so large, passphrases such as lares ave ghent were possible, 
suggesting that perhaps using a smaller wordlist would produce more memorable 
passphrases. 
Despite any usability issues Diceware may have, as well as its failure to gain 
traction with typical users, Diceware has started to see some implementation in 
security-conscious circles. Diceware has been used since 2012 by the leading privacy-
focused search engine DuckDuckGo to store user settings, and it is recommended by the 
password manager 1Password to create the master password (Shiner, 2013). The recent 
use of Diceware in the wild mirrors the general need to switch to passphrases from 
passwords for increased security. 
To examine the effect of different wordlists on randomly generated passphrases, 
Shay et al. conducted a study using 1,476 online participants and a variety of system-
generated passphrase conditions, including passphrases with wordlists of size 181, 401, 
and 1024 consisting of three and four words (2012). There was found to be little 
difference between wordlists of these sizes. Memorability was affected more by the 




typographical errors found by Keith, Shao, and Steinbart. Interestingly, the Diceware 
wordlist prioritizes short words (Reinhold, 2012). 
Integration of Techniques 
The system-generated mnemonic phrases of Chapters 3 and 4 work directly with 
existing password systems because the passwords themselves, not the mnemonics, are 
stored. Nevertheless, as the majority of systems these days support longer passphrases, 
the work in Chapters 3 and 4 could be extended to generate passphrases instead of 
passwords. In this scenario, the user would type Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas instead 
of using the phrase to remember jpwjaop. Because the individual words chosen would 
now impact security, this change would necessitate greatly expanding the size of the 
wordlist while attempting not to erode the usability benefit resulting from the 
specialized wordlist. In essence, the generated passphrases should still involve simple 
words and maintain a simple structure. 
Shay et al. recommended that perhaps the most promising area for improving 
memorability of passphrases lies in asking users to construct a scene or story relating to 
their passphrase (2012). The work discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 found that asking users 
to create a mnemonic picture to assist them with system-generated passphrases did 
improve the level of usability of those passphrases. 
The new input masking technique covered in Chapter 5, which also works easily 
with current password systems and policies already in place, could be extended to 




readable input text tends to stand out amidst a sea of unreadable decoy text. For 
instance, Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas might be surrounded by Utww!d ape hzwq 
ufde lep zfc atkkld or Hgjj/q ncr umjd hsqr yrc msp ngxxyq, which would make it easy for 
attackers to find the genuine passphrase. 
By incorporating a dictionary component into the system, readable text could be 
masked with other readable decoy text. Since typing errors are expected to increase as 
text string length grows and as typing speed rises due to the use of plain language 
passphrases, the proposed system might enjoy additional benefits when compared to 
other input masking techniques. 
The hope is that by leveraging both the natural tendency of passphrases to imply 
a mental scene, as well as the reduced typographical errors resulting from usable input 




CHAPTER 3: MNEMONICS TO AID SYSTEM-GENERATED PASSWORD RETENTION 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on previously published work (Juang, Ranganayakulu, & 
Greenstein, 2012). 
The impetus for this study is the idea that user-generated passwords have been 
shown to be insecure, while system-generated passwords have been shown to be 
difficult to use. The majority of prior work has attempted to increase the security of 
user-generated passwords, while this study focuses on increasing the usability of 
system-generated passwords. 
The first innovation of this study is the implementation of a specialized wordlist 
and template to generate consistently simple mnemonic sentences to help users 
remember their passwords, with no resulting change in security. Previous research in 
password mnemonics resulted in complex phrases that users did not like. 
The second innovation is prompting the user to generate a mnemonic picture 
during account creation that is shown during the login process. This transforms the login 
task from one of uncued recall to more memorable cued recall. 
We aim to investigate the effect that these contributions have on the usability 
and security of system-generated passwords. We hypothesize that they increase 





The basis of our mnemonic phrase system relies on the realization that we can 
use a tiny specialized wordlist to construct our mnemonics from any given password. 
Since the mnemonic itself has no bearing on security, but functions only as an aid to the 
user, even a single sentence template with a direct mapping of letters to words is 
acceptable. We can thus design our exact wordlist and character positions so that all 
possible combinations make meaningful sense and only use simple grammar and 
vocabulary, as seen in Figure 1. 
 
 





We were able to come up with an appropriate word for each possible letter. 
However, some positions of particular letters (such as q, x, and z) resulted in words that 
could be considered difficult, especially to some of the international students in our 
pilot study. In addition, certain words that were easy for one person sometimes proved 
difficult for another, due to background or culture differences. 
Because of these issues, we decided to screen the entire wordlist with people 
from different cultures. After being identified as difficult by more than one person, 
words and the letters in positions that would lead to those words were removed for the 
purposes of our study. Our system is robust enough that minor deletions or additions to 
the wordlist hardly affect its security, but to be fair, we screened out the same positions 
of letters from all conditions in our study. 
A visual aid during login is the next major component of our system. Upon 
presenting the user with an automatically generated mnemonic during account 
creation, a simple paint program and a browser window are also opened by the system. 
By default, the browser window displays automatically generated search results of 
images related to the mnemonic. 
The user’s task is to draw a personal visual reminder, of any size, in the paint 
program. For convenience, images found in any image search or elsewhere on the Web 
can be copied and pasted directly into the paint program. The user can copy as few or as 
many images as he or she wishes. As illustrated in Figure 2, the picture is typically 




Since our system opens the appropriate file in the paint program and later 
automatically saves it, the user does not need to specify or upload the finished file. This 
picture is then displayed back to the user on the login screen when he or she attempts 
to sign in later. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The mnemonic phrase and picture complement each other as simple, effective memory aids. 
 
Method 
Threat Models and Limitations 
For our study, an adversary is assumed to have complete knowledge of our 
implementation, including the wordlist. We wanted to test the ability of users to 
remember passwords for multiple accounts simultaneously, as prior research has 
focused on single accounts. Naturally, this greatly increases task difficulty and 




Although we have followed the NIST level 2 guidelines for authentication 
security (Burr et al., 2006) of at least 30 bits of entropy 
(                                                          ), distributed 
computing power has been greatly expanding. Should the current system-generated 
passwords become too weak to withstand brute-force attacks, it is trivial to modify our 
system to generate longer passphrases instead of mnemonics for passwords. On the 
other hand, to protect against adversaries who know our specific system, the wordlist 
would be expanded but could still retain simple words as best as possible. Additional 
sentence templates would also be added. 
In our study, we did not force participants to take a specified amount of time to 
create their account. While the effect of condition on memorability could be mediated 
by creation time, if the system-generated mnemonic policy naturally encourages the 
user to think more deeply about the mnemonic, we feel this indirect effect is every bit 
as important as the direct effect of condition on memorability. 
The use of pictures in our system leaks a small amount of information out to 
potential adversaries. We did not prohibit participants from creating laughably insecure 
“pictures” such as the original password in text form. Perhaps because they did not 
mind the task, or they understood the drawbacks, none of our participants created such 
weak pictures. 
After our initial study was completed, we decided to quantitatively test the 




previously created passwords. All of these participants created three passwords using 
our system and were provided with general and system-specific password guessing tips, 
as well as full knowledge of our implementation including the complete wordlist used. 
Subjects 
We recruited 54 college students (34 males, 20 females), ranging from age 19 to 
35, via word of mouth and promotional fliers posted in several locations on campus. 
Each participant was compensated $8 for taking part in our study. All participants had 
over five years of computer experience and normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight. 
Experimental Design 
The study utilized a between-subject design. Participants were assigned to 
conditions based on a balanced Latin square. Participants created three passwords using 
one of the mnemonic policies investigated: 
1. None: the user is not instructed to utilize any mnemonic aid 
2. User-generated: the user creates his or her own mnemonic phrase based on 
guidelines from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Scarfone 
& Souppaya, 2009) 
3. System-generated: the user receives a randomly created mnemonic phrase 
(as specified in the earlier Implementation section) and then creates a 





Each session started with a brief overview of the study, after which participants 
signed an informed consent form and completed a short pre-test demographic 
questionnaire. 
Regardless of condition, each user received three system-generated passwords 
in sequence, one at a time. For each password, the participants were asked to memorize 
the password and then enter it when ready to create an account. Participants were 
instructed to pay close attention to which passwords corresponded to which accounts. 
Depending on the condition, part of the memorization process might have 
involved creating or reinforcing a mnemonic. Upon successful entry of the given 
password, the process was repeated until all three accounts were created. 
Participants then completed the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988) and the System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996). These tests 
measured the workload and usability of the account creation task. 
After a five-minute distraction task of solving two-digit mental arithmetic 
problems, participants moved to the authentication phase. One of the three accounts 
was randomly selected and users were prompted to sign in using the appropriate 
password. Participants were given a maximum of five attempts to sign in successfully 
before a failure was recorded instead. The process was then repeated until the login 




Finally, participants completed another NASA-TLX and SUS. This time, these tests 
measured the workload and usability of the password recall task. The total time 
required to complete the experiment was approximately thirty minutes. 
Approximately a week after each participant’s first session, he or she was invited 
back for a second session to repeat the recall tasks. Participants were specifically 
instructed not to write down or rehearse their passwords in the meantime. 
Subsequently, twenty-four participants were tasked with attempting to guess 
the passwords of five accounts: three of the system-generated mnemonic condition and 
two of a no-picture control condition, representing the other conditions. The system 
treated these adversaries in exactly the same manner as ordinary users, including the 
five attempts allowed. 
Dependent Variables 
All measures, both objective and subjective, were recorded by the system: 
 Creation time: seconds taken to create an account, measured from the 
presentation of the system-generated password to the successful account 
creation 
 Recall time: seconds taken to either succeed or eventually fail to sign in to an 
account, measured starting from the presentation of the login screen 
 Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) for both effectiveness and 
security: the length in edits (total sum of single character insertions, 




one string to another) between the participant’s recollection or guess of a 
password and the actual stored password 
 Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990) for both effectiveness and security: 
the similarity or correlation between the participant’s recollection or guess of 
a password and the actual stored password, normalized such that 0 indicates 
no similarity and 1 indicates equality 
 Success: a binary metric of either eventual success or failure to sign in 
 Creation and recall NASA-TLX indices addressing mental demand, physical 
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration, each on a 
7-point Likert scale 
 Creation and recall SUS scores addressing usability, each out of a total of 100 
possible points 
Results 
We used SPSS 19 for the data analysis. For the majority of our dependent 
variables, we used a one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval to determine 
significance. Welch’s correction was used whenever variances were heterogeneous. 
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which mnemonic policies differed 
significantly from one another. The Games-Howell test was used in place of Tukey’s HSD 
whenever variances were heterogeneous. 
Since the creation time and recall time did not follow a normal distribution, a log 




ANOVA as before was then conducted. The security measures used t-tests. Success was 
analyzed using a binary logistic regression. 
Objective Measures 
Efficiency. The results indicate a significant difference for creation time (F=326, 
p<.001) but not for first-session recall time (F=2.41, p=.093) or second-session recall 
time (F=0.476, p=.622). The creation time in seconds was shortest for the mnemonic 
policy of none (M=32.0), next shortest for user-generated mnemonic (M=107), and 
longest for system-generated mnemonic (M=338). The mean first-session recall times in 
seconds were 46.6 for none, 78.8 for user-generated mnemonic, and 60.0 for system-
generated mnemonic. For the second session, the mean recall times were 70.8, 94.9, 
and 69.4 seconds, respectively. 
Effectiveness. There were statistically significant differences for first-session 
(F=22.3, p<.001) and second-session Damerau-Levenshtein distance (F=17.3, p<.001), 
and, as seen in Figure 3, first-session (F=17.7, p<.001) and second-session Jaro-Winkler 
proximity (F=14.3, p<.001). The Damerau-Levenshtein distance (first-session; second-
session) was shortest for system-generated (M=0.150; M=0.930), next shortest for user-
generated (M=1.35; M=3.15), and longest for none (M=2.54, M=3.43). The Jaro-Winkler 
proximity (first-session; second-session) was highest for system-generated (M=.987; 
M=.928), next highest for user-generated (M=.892; M=.750), and lowest for none 
(M=.768; M=.726). For both measures, there were no significant differences between 






Figure 3.3. 2nd-session Jaro-Winkler proximity (larger values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
The effect of mnemonic policy on success was also determined to be statistically 
significant for both the first session (χ2=29.8, p<.001) and second session (χ2=13.8, 
p=.001). The first-session success rate was 87.0% for system-generated, 53.7% for user-
generated, and 38.9% for none. As seen in Figure 4, the second-session success rate was 
59.3% for system-generated, 33.3% for user-generated, and 25.9% for none. These 







Figure 3.4. 2nd-session success rate (larger values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
Security. There was a statistically significant difference for the Damerau-
Levenshtein distance between the adversaries’ guesses and the actual passwords 
(F=8.31, p=.005). The Damerau-Levenshtein distance was longer for the no-picture 
condition (M=6.40) than the system-generated mnemonic condition (M=5.67), as shown 
in Figure 5. There was no statistically significant difference for the Jaro-Winkler 
proximity between the adversaries’ guesses and the actual passwords (F=0.999, p=.320). 
The mean Jaro-Winkler proximity was .428 for the no-picture condition and .499 for the 
system-generated mnemonic condition. These values can be seen in Figure 6. No 













Figure 3.6. Adversarial Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security) 
 
Subjective Measures 
Workload. The only workload metric to achieve significance in the creation task 
was mental demand (F=3.81, p=.029). The mental demand was significantly lower for 
system-generated (M=4.94) than none (M=6.00). For first-session recall workload, 
mental demand (F=5.02, p=.010) and effort (F=4.14, p=.022) proved statistically 
significant. The mental demand of system-generated (M=4.00) was significantly lower 
than user-generated (M=5.56) and none (M=5.78). System-generated (M=3.44) 




did participants who did not use a mnemonic (M=4.94). There were no significant 
differences in workload for the second session. 
Usability. In the creation (F=9.53, p<.001), first-session recall (F=7.05, p=.002), 
and second-session recall (F=7.66, p=.001) tasks, differences in the SUS measure were 
statistically significant. The usability score (creation; first-session recall; second-session 
recall) for system-generated (M=66.0; M=68.3; M=66.7) was significantly higher than 
user-generated (except for second-session) (M=50.6; M=46.8; M=51.2) and none 









As a whole, the results indicate a promising outlook for the use of mnemonics to 
help users remember system-generated passwords. That outlook is particularly hopeful 
for our implementation of system-generated mnemonics. 
Although the creation time for the system-generated mnemonic condition was 
much longer than the other conditions, account creation is a one-time event where 
successfully encoding the password into memory is much more important than the 
speed of the process. A forgotten password could potentially cause a far greater loss of 
time down the road than any initial time investment. 
In contrast to creation time, any differences in recall time would lead to a 
cumulative effect over repeated logins. Therefore, it is encouraging that differences in 
recall time were not statistically significant between any of the conditions, although 
system-generated mnemonics and the absence of a mnemonic tended to be faster than 
user-generated mnemonics. 
Regarding security, the Damerau-Levenshtein distance is useful primarily as a 
measure of strength against brute-force attacks. While the security of our system as 
measured this way was significantly lower than the control condition, the mean 
difference was less than three-fourths of a character. On the other hand, there was no 
significant difference in Jaro-Winkler proximity, which is useful primarily as an indication 




When participants created pictures, the weakest parts of the mnemonic phrases 
tended to be the nouns. This suggests that the possible addition of one non-noun to 
each phrase could cover the Damerau-Levenshtein difference, hopefully without 
degrading usability. It is worth emphasizing that when compared to the status quo of 
user-generated passwords, all of the conditions tested would be far more secure. 
The results for recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity 
show that whether we evaluate only exact matches or take near misses into account, 
there are clear divisions in memorability. System-generated mnemonics consistently 
performed better than the other two conditions. 
By looking at the success rates for the three conditions, we see that a user 
utilizing a system-generated mnemonic is 1.78 times likelier to succeed in recalling his or 
her password than someone using a user-generated mnemonic and 2.29 times likelier to 
succeed than someone using no mnemonic. 
The SUS scores indicate that users generally considered the system-generated 
mnemonic condition to be the most usable. The NASA-TLX results show that participants 
using system-generated mnemonics were not subjected to increased workload levels. If 
anything, their ratings tended to be more favorable compared to ratings for the other 
conditions, even during the account creation task. 
By striving to outperform the security of user-created passwords and improve on 
the usability of randomly assigned passwords, we developed a system-generated 




and display. We demonstrated that users with system-generated passwords can benefit 




CHAPTER 4: METHODS OF MNEMONIC CREATION FOR AUTHENTICATION 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on previously published work (Fraune, Juang, Greenstein, 
Chalil Madathil, & Koikkara, 2013). 
The study in Chapter 3 determined that mnemonic phrases and images increased 
the usability of system-generated passwords. However, security was slightly decreased. 
In that study, we allowed participants to choose between drawing a picture, arranging 
online images into a collage, or combining both drawings and online images. In addition, 
there was no condition that tested system-generated mnemonic phrases with no 
picture aid. 
This study investigates the effect of different types of picture generation. All 
conditions utilize system-generated passwords as well as system-generated mnemonics. 
Our goal is to identify specifically which aspects of picture generation, if any, exhibit the 
largest effects on the previously demonstrated usability improvements. If a particular 
method proves most effective, we can use this method exclusively in future work. On 
the other hand, if there are hardly any differences between picture methods (excluding 
the no picture condition), we may still want to standardize the procedure for 
consistency. If we find no differences between any of the conditions (including the no 
picture condition), this would suggest that the previous usability improvements were 




Based on the generation and self-reference effects, we hypothesize that the 
drawing condition might be the most memorable, followed by the combined condition, 
then the online image condition, then a steep drop-off to the no picture condition. This 
mirrors the level of involvement required of the user in picture creation. 
Likewise, because user-drawn pictures should provide less shared information 
than found images located by an online search engine, we hypothesize the drawing 
condition to be the most secure of the picture conditions, followed by the combined 
condition, and then the online image condition. The no picture condition would exhibit 
the greatest level of security since no picture cues are provided to potential attackers. 
Method 
Experimental Design 
The study used a within-subjects design to test the effectiveness of different 
types of user-made pictures as mnemonic devices to cue the recall of phrases that in 
turn represent computer-generated passwords. Another within-subjects design was 
employed to evaluate the success of using pictures to attempt to crack users’ 
passwords. 
Participants 
Twenty-nine participants were recruited from Clemson University by word of 
mouth and e-mail for a convenience sample. Recruits who failed to pass a test for color 




age 21 to 38, were ultimately included in the study. No attrition occurred between 
sessions. 
Procedure 
In both sessions, participants worked at a desktop computer, and a researcher 
explained the purpose of the study. After signing the informed consent form, 
participants completed a demographic questionnaire and a test for color blindness 
(Ishihara, 1987). They then received training for the password creation system, covering 
the following points: 
1. For each password, the system generates a random string of seven lower-
case Latin letters (e.g., “blmiccs”) 
2. For each password, the system generates an English phrase such that the 
first letter of each word corresponds to a letter in the password (e.g., the 
password “blmiccs” corresponds to the phrase, “Barbara’s little mouse 
intently chewed countless sandwiches”) 
3. For each phrase, the user is asked to create a picture in accordance with 
further instructions 
4. Tips for creating secure images are provided (e.g., do not include words from 
the phrase in the picture) 
After training, the computer presented four successive account login screens 
along with four unique corresponding passwords and phrases that they were asked to 




create a digital picture using one of the following methods. Conditions were presented 
in a counterbalanced order across subjects to minimize order effects: 
1. NP – participants made no picture 
2. D – participants drew a picture using a paint application 
3. OI – participants used online images to create a picture or collage 
4. DOIC – participants combined drawings and online images in a paint 
application 
After creating each account, participants completed the NASA Task Load Index 
(NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 1988) and the System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 
1996) to assess the workload and usability of the system. Participants created all four 
accounts, and then completed a five-minute mental arithmetic distractor task. For the 
second part of Session 1, participants were prompted to type their passwords into the 
matching accounts in a randomized order. For all conditions except the No Picture (NP) 
control, participants were shown the pictures they had previously created. Five 
unsuccessful login attempts were deemed an overall failure for the particular account, 
and participants proceeded to the next task. Again, participants completed the NASA-
TLX and SUS after each condition. Session 1 lasted approximately forty-five minutes. 
Session 2 occurred roughly one week after initial participation. Participants 
returned to the study location and repeated the second part of Session 1. Participants 
who did not remember their passwords during Session 1 were still invited back to try 




Participants then simulated attackers trying to decode others’ passwords. 
Participants were given general and system-specific training on how to crack passwords 
from pictures, and participants were also provided the list of 182 words from which the 
computer generated the phrases to match the passwords in order to simulate an 
attacker that might have used the system until discovering all or most of the words 
used. Participants attacked two accounts of each of the four different conditions, all for 
different users. For each account, participants were asked to make at least one attempt 
and allowed up to five attempts to login. Session 2 lasted about thirty minutes. 
Measures 
The computer recorded the time users took to memorize passwords, including 
the time to create the picture. Then, for every login attempt, of “user” and “attacker,” 
the system recorded the following: 
 Time taken to correctly enter each password 
 Success: a successful or failed login attempt 
 Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964): the length in edits (total 
sum of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent 
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the 
participant’s typed password and the actual password 
 Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990): the similarity between the 





 NASA-TLX scores to measure workload of creating the picture and 
memorizing the password, and of the two login processes 
 SUS scores to measure the usability of creating the picture and memorizing 
the password, and of the two login processes 
Results 
Data were analyzed using SPSS 19. For most data, repeated measures within-
subjects 4 (condition) x 2 (session) ANOVAs were run. For login success, a binary logistic 
regression was performed. If Mauchly’s test of sphericity was insignificant at the .05 
alpha level, sphericity was assumed. If sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser 
test was performed with appropriate corrections. Two-tailed Pearson’s tests were used 
for correlations. For post-hoc analyses, LSD was used with a Bonferroni correction to 
adjust for multiple comparisons, and a simple effects test was used to evaluate 
interactions. 
Creation. Analysis revealed a statistically significant difference between 
conditions in creation time (F=27.2, p<.001), as seen in Figure 8. The only significant 
difference was that NP (M=61.3) took the least amount of time to create (D: M=390; OI: 






Figure 4.1. Account creation time (smaller values indicate increased efficiency) 
 
Recall. No differences were found for recall time for successful logins among 
conditions (F=0.509, p=.677) or between sessions (F=0.241, p=.625), and no interaction 
was found (F=2.49, p=.067). 
Login. Condition had no significant main effect on login success (χ2=6.11, 
p=.106), as shown in Figure 9, although the mean success rate for NP was lower than 
the other conditions. Differences among sessions were found to be significant (χ2=14.0, 
p<.001), with participants succeeding more during Login 1 (success rate of 52.1%) than 
in Login 2 (success rate of 26.0%). No interaction was found between Condition and 






Figure 4.2. Success rate: login (larger values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
Figure 10 indicates that Condition affected Damerau-Levenshtein distance 
(F=6.93, p=.002), as did Session (F=22.4, p<.001). Participants in NP (M=2.92) had a 
larger Damerau-Levenshtein distance than those in other conditions (D: M=1.52; OI: 
M=2.75; DOIC: M=2.63), indicating that participants entered passwords less accurately 
during NP than in the Picture conditions across Logins 1 and 2. No differences were 
found among the Picture conditions. A larger Damerau-Levenshtein distance was also 








Figure 4.3. Damerau-Levenshtein distance: login and attack (smaller values indicate increased similarity) 
 
Condition and Session affected Jaro-Winkler proximity (Condition: F=7.78, 
p=.002; Session: F=19.9, p<.001), as seen in Figure 11, but there was no significant 
interaction between Condition and Session for Jaro-Winkler proximity (F=0.220, p=.767). 
During the NP condition (M=.724), participants had significantly lower Jaro-Winkler 
proximities than in the other conditions (D: M=.885; OI: M=.879; DOIC: M=.910), 




Picture conditions. No significant differences were found among other conditions 




Figure 4.4. Jaro-Winkler proximity: login and attack (larger values indicate increased similarity) 
 
Security. During attacks, no significant effect was found for Condition on 
Damerau-Levenshtein distance (F=2.37, p=.078), as seen in Figure 10, or on Jaro-Winkler 
proximity (F=0.520, p=.668), as seen in Figure 11. Time taken to attack correlated with 
success determining passwords, as measured by Damerau-Levenshtein distance (r=-




Subjective Ratings. NASA-TLX scores indicated higher ratings of physical demand 
(F=7.13, p=.002) during Creation than Login 1 (p=.003) or Login 2 (p=.031). NP was rated 
consistently lower in physical demand than the other conditions (p<.001). While DOIC 
was rated much less demanding during Logins 1 and 2 than Creation (p<.001), D was 
rated more demanding during Login 1 than Creation and Login 2 (p<.001), and OI was 
rated less demanding during Login 1 than during Creation and Login 2 (p<.001). 
Participants rated their performance (F=15.7, p<.001) worse during Login 2 than 
during Creation (p<.001) or Login 1 (p<.001). Similarly, frustration (F=7.73, p=.001) was 
rated higher during Login 2 than during Creation (p=.005) or Login 1 (p=.040). 
The usability of the systems (F=7.70, p=.001) was rated lower for Login 2 than 
during Creation (p=.013) or Login 1 (p=.011), as seen in Figure 12. Analysis revealed no 







Figure 4.5. SUS: creation and login (larger values indicate increased usability) 
 
Discussion 
Account creation took longer in the Picture conditions than in the No Picture 
(NP) condition. However, no significant differences were found in recall time, success 
rates, or security among conditions. The increased memorability of passwords in the 
Picture conditions (according to Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler 
proximity) may justify the extra time required to create accounts, though it has not yet 





As expected, login success, measured by success rate, Damerau-Levenshtein 
distance, and Jaro-Winkler proximity, dropped from the first to second session, 
confirming that participants tend to forget their passwords over time. Complementing 
these findings, participants rated Login 2 as characterized by more failure, less usability, 
and more frustration than Login 1. No differences were found for ratings of mental or 
temporal demand or effort. The low success rate (20-60%) was also expected because 
participants were asked to memorize four passwords at once and did not use them for a 
week; in practice, expected success rates for any one of these conditions would be 
higher. 
Although no significant differences were found among conditions for login 
success, more sensitive measures (Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler 
proximity) revealed that creating pictures increases password memorability. This 
suggests that in the study in Chapter 3, the top performance of the system-generated 
mnemonic and picture condition was due, at least in part, to picture creation. However, 
it is unclear whether this benefit is due to creating the picture during account creation 
(employing the generation and self-reference effects), viewing the picture during login 
(to cue recall), taking more time to create the account, thinking more deeply about the 
phrase due to picture creation, or a particular combination of the above. Future studies 
might unpack these considerations in order to develop a more focused approach to the 




Both Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity (which are 
better suited to measure the threat of brute-force and guessing attacks, respectively) 
indicated that Picture conditions were no easier to crack than the No Picture (NP) 
condition. Time spent attempting to crack accounts correlated with coming closer to 
cracking them, suggesting that effort moderated cracking success.  
Future studies might investigate the possible additional security gleaned from 
varying the structure of computer-generated phrases. This would not be expected to 
decrease memorability because participants would still see only one phrase structure 
per password. In fact, different phrase structures may help differentiate among 
accounts and decrease interference among phrases. Although the system’s current 
small word bank relies on familiar words to make phrases more memorable, increasing 
the word bank might also enhance security by making pictures less susceptible to attack. 
This study revealed that when computer-generated random passwords are 
combined with computer-generated mnemonic phrases, user-created pictures assist in 




CHAPTER 5: INPUT MASKING TECHNIQUES FOR AUTHENTICATION 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on previously published work (Juang & Greenstein, 2011). 
In contrast to Chapters 3 and 4, which dealt primarily with bolstering the 
memorability of system-generated passwords, the study in this chapter investigates how 
to increase the usability of the actual login process. When a user authenticates to a 
system, there are different methods that may be used to hide the login input from 
shoulder surfers. 
At the extreme end of focusing entirely on usability, the text can be displayed as 
cleartext. At the opposite end of focusing solely on security, no feedback at all can be 
displayed to the user. In between these extremes are all the possible input masking 
techniques that aim to strike a balance between usability and security. The majority of 
previous work has attempted to strengthen security beyond the status quo of bullet 
masking, while this study focuses on improving on the usability of bullet masking. 
The main innovation of this study is the implementation of a novel input masking 
technique that hides the login input in plain sight using decoys. The user can see the 
correct input in real time as it is being entered, while a shoulder surfer would not know 
which input on the screen is legitimate. 
We aim to examine the effect that different input masking techniques, including 




that our new system combines the usability benefits of cleartext with the security 
benefits of no feedback. 
Implementation 
We present Purloin: a novel input masking technique based on the concept of 
hiding something in plain view, from Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” We 
accomplish this without needing to alter the display of the sensitive input itself. Instead, 
by using superfluous input (decoys) to mask legitimate input, we strive to combine the 
usability advantage of unmasked text with the security advantage of masked text. 
Purloin relies on the addition of any amount of decoy text surrounding typed 
text, as seen in Figure 13. The correct input text is automatically mapped to a certain 
color and position, which are tied together for redundancy. As a result, once the user 
first determines where to look, he or she will always know where to look for all future 






Figure 5.1. The decoy text obfuscates the password while also acting as a trap for potential attackers. 
 
If the text to be entered is already known by the system, it can be mapped to a 
consistent position; otherwise, the position would have to be decided randomly. Even if 
the system does not know what the user will enter a priori, the user can still determine 
the appropriate position as he or she types. The decoy text is generated by applying a 
Caesar cipher (character-rotational encryption) to the plaintext input for each decoy. 
Letters, numbers, and symbols are all rotated within their own space so that each 
character is replaced with the same type of character. Each decoy is shifted by a 
different amount when possible, in order to avoid duplication of characters. 
If submitted input text is incorrect but can be rotated into the correct text, 




attacker and notify the legitimate user. This provides resistance against a camera-based 
attack that seeks to try each row one at a time. 
In the case of repeated shoulder surfing, a dedicated attacker with long-term 
physical access could still try to figure out which text remains consistent across input 
sessions. This type of attack is prevented if the system stores both the text to be 
entered and the associated decoys. All rows can then be displayed consistently across 
sessions. Although this method requires additional information to be stored by the 
system, the result is an increase in security with no adverse effect on usability. 
Based on a pilot study, we settled on ten rows of text as a tradeoff between 
security and usability. Once color was included to help signify the uniqueness of each 
row, the participants in our pilot study were able to quickly determine how to use 
Purloin without instructions. Providing basic support on first use would still make sense 
in a production environment, so the user is not startled. 
We created a working Purloin implementation in Java 6 as well as a system for 
running the experiment, including faithful implementations for other common input 
masking techniques. We selected colors for Purloin such that no adjacent positions 
would be difficult to distinguish for all major types of color-blindness. 
Method 
Threat Model and Limitations 
For our study, a shoulder surfer was defined as an adversary with the ability to 




and QWERTY keyboard. The shoulder surfer was allowed any technique to obtain the 
input – including taking notes – other than physical contact or looking at the user’s 
provided sheet of assigned text. The user was allowed any technique to prevent the 
shoulder surfer from succeeding other than physical contact. 
All input to be entered was in the form of randomly generated lowercase 
alphanumeric text strings (sequences of characters) of length eight. Although these did 
not represent “typical” weak user-generated passwords, they were in line with existing 
security guidelines for creating strong passwords (Burr et al., 2006). Participants were 
given practice with our assigned input strings, but their level of experience with the 
input would nevertheless be much higher with passwords that were already familiar to 
them. 
The participants took turns as both the user and shoulder surfer, so they were 
well aware that the study involved testing computer security. In fact, because of these 
dual roles, participants tried hard to thwart their respective partner in a friendly bid to 
outperform the other. In the wild, many users do not realize when they are being 
shoulder surfed, and shoulder surfers are not free to act without fear of being caught. 
Ethical considerations would have to be addressed when conducting a real-world 
shoulder surfing study. 
Subjects 
We recruited 14 senior or graduate level engineering students (11 males, 3 




of participants. All participants had over five years of computer experience and normal 
or corrected-to-normal eyesight. 
Experimental Design 
The study utilized a within-subject repeated measures design. Participants were 
assigned to conditions based on a balanced Latin square to minimize order effects. 
Participants completed all of the input masking techniques investigated: 
1. Cleartext: no input masking (displayed as normal text) 
2. Invisible: no on-screen indication for typed text (usually seen in command 
line interfaces) 
3. Bullet-masked: one bullet per typed character (ubiquitous on both the 
desktop and online) 
4. Interval-masked: each newly typed character transforms into a bullet after 
the following character is typed or a 2-second interval has passed (usually 
seen in mobile devices) 
5. Decoy-masked: typed text is hidden in plain view with the addition of decoy 
text surrounding it (see earlier Implementation section for Purloin) 
“Bullet-masked with a checkbox to toggle into cleartext” was also considered, 
but our pilot study showed that users almost never selected the checkbox even when 
left alone and explicitly told they were in a secure location. Users typically claimed the 




and so it was not worth the effort to click it. Regardless of the validity of these claims, 
these findings made the inclusion of this technique redundant for this study. 
Procedure 
Each session started with a brief overview of the study, after which participants 
signed an informed consent form and completed a short pre-test demographic 
questionnaire. One participant was randomly selected to begin as the user and the 
other as the shoulder surfer. 
For each masking technique, each user completed a set of three text strings. For 
each string, the user entered the text five times correctly. Incorrect inputs prompted the 
user to try again. On the fifth time for each string, the shoulder surfer was allowed that 
one opportunity to observe. Next, the shoulder surfer was asked to enter the observed 
text as accurately as possible using a second keyboard. Upon completion of each 
masking technique, the user completed the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988) and an abridged set of seven questions taken from the Computer 
System Usability Questionnaire (CSUQ) (Lewis, 1995). 
After completing the entire list of fifteen inputs, the user assigned a unique 
ranked preference for each input masking technique during a short post-test 
questionnaire. Participants were given the chance to take a break before switching roles 
and repeating the procedure. The total time required to complete the full experiment 





Objective measures were recorded by the system: 
 Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964): the length in edits (total 
sum of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent 
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the 
shoulder surfer’s observation and the actual input 
 Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990): the similarity or correlation between 
the shoulder surfer’s observation and the actual input, normalized such that 
0 indicates no similarity and 1 indicates equality 
 Task completion time: mean time in seconds of all (five) correct inputs for 
each string, measured for each input from the first typed character to 
eventual successful entry 
 Error rate: the number of incorrect inputs plus the number of times the user 
restarted (by hitting backspace at least three consecutive times to clear the 
entire input), divided by that sum plus the number of correct inputs (five) 
Subjective measures were completed by the participants on paper forms and 
tallied during data analysis: 
 CSUQ questions addressing ease of use, effectiveness, efficiency, perceived 
security, learnability, recoverability, and satisfaction, on a 5-point Likert scale 
 NASA-TLX indices addressing mental demand, physical demand, temporal 




 Preference rankings for usability, security, and overall, determined by 
assigning each input masking technique a unique number from 1 to 5 
Distance was chosen instead of simple match rate because an adversary would 
still be able to launch a successful attack by programmatically examining close text 
strings. The NASA-TLX was used to evaluate whether the added complexity or 
distraction of input masking contributed to user workload. 
Results 
We used SPSS 18 for the data analysis. For the majority of our dependent 
variables, we used a repeated measures one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval 
to determine significance. Welch’s correction was used whenever variances were 
heterogeneous. Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which input masking 
techniques differed significantly from one another. Since the error rate and user 
preference rankings did not follow a normal distribution, we used a Friedman test for 
each of those measures. We then used pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with Dunn-
Šidák correction to see which techniques differed significantly. 
Objective Measures 
Security. The results indicate significant differences for Damerau-Levenshtein 
distance (F=46.8, p<.001) and Jaro-Winkler proximity (F=33.3, p<.001). The Damerau-
Levenshtein distance was shortest for cleartext (M=0.640), next shortest for interval-
masked (2.38), and longest for the subset of invisible (5.57), bullet-masked (5.79), and 




for cleartext (.958) and interval-masked (.856) than it was for invisible (.595), bullet-














Figure 5.3. Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security) 
 
Usability. As seen in Figure 16, there was no statistical significance for task 
completion time (F=0.533, p=.712). The error rate (χ2=22.9, p<.001) was higher for 
invisible (M=.094), bullet-masked (.091), and interval-masked (.087) than it was for 













Figure 5.5. Error rate (smaller values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
Subjective Ratings 
Usability. The invisible masking technique was rated lower for ease of use, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and learnability than the other input masking techniques. For 
recoverability (F=25.3, p<.001), invisible (M=1.71) was also rated lowest, with bullet-
masked (3.14) rating lower than cleartext (4.50) and interval-masked (3.71). For 
perceived security (F=7.91, p<.001), cleartext (1.79) rated significantly lower than 
invisible (3.86), bullet-masked (4.07), and decoy-masked (3.79). Cleartext (2.50) was also 
rated lower than bullet-masked (3.71) and decoy-masked (3.79) in terms of overall 













Figure 5.7. The last four subjective usability ratings (larger values indicate increased usability) 
 
Workload. There was no statistical significance (p>.05) for physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, or frustration. For mental demand (F=3.91, p=.007), 
invisible (M=4.36) was rated significantly higher than cleartext (1.79). Invisible (4.36) 
was rated higher than cleartext (2.29), bullet-masked (2.29), and interval-masked (2.43) 
in terms of effort (F=4.37, p=.003). 
Preference Rankings 
Usability. The rank of invisible (M=5.00) was significantly worse (χ2=39.9, p<.001) 




decoy-masked (2.64). In addition, bullet-masked and interval-masked ranked worse than 
cleartext, the category winner. These results are displayed in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Preference rankings (smaller values indicate increased preference) 
 
Security. Based on experience gained from both the user and shoulder surfer 
perspectives, participants ranked cleartext (M=5.00) significantly worse (χ2=42.6, 
p<.001) than all others: invisible (1.36), bullet-masked (2.50), interval-masked (3.64), 
and decoy-masked (2.50). Interval-masked ranked worse than invisible and bullet-
masked, the category winners. Although the bullet-masked and decoy-masked means 




Overall. Based on the entire range of factors in selecting an input masking 
technique, cleartext (M=4.50) ranked significantly worse (χ2=29.5, p<.001) than bullet-
masked (2.14), interval-masked (2.71), and decoy-masked (1.79). Furthermore, invisible 
(3.86) ranked significantly worse than decoy-masked, the overall winner. 
Discussion 
The results support several conclusions with practical ramifications for input 
masking policy. Cleartext performed worst in both objective and subjective measures of 
security. Invisible input performed worst in both objective and especially subjective 
measures of usability and workload. These were the least preferred input masking 
methods overall. 
Purloin (decoy-masked) appeared to indeed capture the best of both worlds, as 
it was the only input masking technique to place in the highest significant subset for 
objective measures of both security and usability. Notably, low error rates resulted from 
being able to see the entire input text as it was being entered. Subjective ratings for 
Purloin were also highly favorable. In addition, it exhibited the best overall preference 
ranking, although this ranking did not differ significantly from bullet-masked or interval-
masked input. 
Conversely, interval-masked input appeared to combine the worst of both 
worlds, as objective measures placed it at the bottom or near-bottom for both security 
and usability. Its subjective ratings and preference rankings were quite positive 




and actual shoulder surfing threat levels for graphical and non-dictionary passwords 
(2006). Interval-masked implementations are currently most prevalent on mobile 
devices. We strongly recommend against their use in desktop settings, but we would 
have to study mobile usage before making suggestions for that domain. 
While conducting the experiment, we noticed that two participants devised a 
clever attack on Purloin. Because the user often hovered over the first key before 
beginning to type, these shoulder surfers were able to determine the first character and 
then locate the row on the screen that started with that character. After the study 
concluded, we modified the system to display the same initial characters on every row. 
The remaining characters follow the original algorithm. 
The effects of reduced screen space on Purloin have yet to be studied. While a 
desktop system can display an overlay to deal with an overcrowded screen, physical 
limitations of mobile devices would necessitate smaller text size, tighter spacing, 
multiple columns of text in each row, or simply fewer rows. 
One possible next step in our research with Purloin is to examine the interaction 
effects between type of input text and input masking technique. Since errors are 
expected to increase as the text string length or complexity grows, Purloin might see 
increased benefits when used with stronger passwords containing upper case and 
symbols. There might also be advantages for plain language passphrases, as the number 
of errors would be expected to increase along with increased typing speed and number 




Purloin does not currently handle readable text gracefully, as readable input text 
tends to stand out amidst a sea of unreadable decoy text. We plan to incorporate a 
dictionary component into our system to support the masking of readable text by using 
words in the decoy text. 
The widespread use of bullet-masked implementations appears to be supported 
by our results. While cleartext enjoys at the very least a concession of security for 
usability, we do not see any situations on the desktop for which it would be preferable 
to switch from bullet-masked to either invisible or interval-masked input. On the other 
hand, the results of this study support the idea that a switch to Purloin should increase 
usability with no loss in security. 
One of the greatest benefits of Purloin is the ease of transition from existing 
input masking techniques. Unlike more complicated shoulder surfing resistant schemes, 
Purloin is simple enough to require neither instructions nor special equipment such as a 
touchscreen or eye tracker. Perhaps most importantly, it works cleanly with the 




CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATING MNEMONICS, INPUT FEEDBACK, AND PASSPHRASES 
Introduction 
The state of the art in the area of passwords lies in their longer, more readable 
cousins: passphrases. The theory is that the added length of passphrases should result in 
an increased level of security, while their word-based nature should simultaneously 
result in an increased level of usability. The drive behind a move to passphrases comes 
from a need to combat the progressing insecurity of passwords, as well as the ability of 
modern authentication systems to support passphrases. 
Running parallel to the existing work in passwords, which focused mainly on 
user-generated passwords, the majority of prior research and in-the-wild 
implementations of passphrases has centered on user-generated passphrases. However, 
researchers have found that the memorability of user-generated passphrases was no 
different from that of user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007). The security benefit 
of user-generated passphrases has also been considered disappointing, as users often 
select relatively weak passphrases (Kuo et al., 2006). 
Previous attempts at system-generated passphrases have produced passphrases 
that have been demonstrated to be difficult to use (Leonhard & Venkatakrishnan, 2007). 
The likely cause is utilizing a wordlist that contains far too many words, resulting in 
individual words that can be extremely uncommon and hard to remember. 
Both user-generated and system-generated passphrases suffer from a great 




recalled the passphrase correctly, login will still fail due to erroneous input caused by a 
lack of feedback provided by standard input masking techniques. 
The research in this chapter incorporates the three major innovations from 
Chapters 3-5: a specialized wordlist and sentence template, a user-created mnemonic 
picture that provides cued recall, and a decoy-based input masking technique. We apply 
these innovations to system-generated passphrases, with the expectation that they will 
prove particularly well suited to passphrases. In the process, we hope to advance the 
state of digital authentication. 
Implementation 
We implemented a new system that integrates our previous contributions (a 
specialized wordlist and sentence template, user-created mnemonic pictures shown 
during login, and a decoy-based input masking technique) with system-generated 
passphrase authentication. The basis for our system is the automated mnemonic phrase 
generator used in Chapters 3 and 4. However, instead of merely using the generated 
phrase to remember a system-generated password, the user now inputs the phrase 
directly to sign in. 
The user-created mnemonic pictures were incorporated, with no significant 
changes necessary, into the existing authentication system from the work in Chapters 3 
and 4. Furthermore, the decoy-based input masking technique from Chapter 5 was 
integrated with the existing authentication system in the formation of our new system. 




from the other words in the wordlist. Without this change, it would be easy for a 
shoulder surfer to identify the legitimate line amidst the character-rotated gibberish. 
Unlike in Chapters 3 and 4, since the generated phrase itself is now the 
authentication secret, the design of the wordlist must be changed to effect the security 
enhancements of a passphrase. It proved to be a delicate balance to expand the size of 
the wordlist to increase security while ensuring that the usability of the system was not 
degraded. Our goal was to maintain the usage of simple words. 
We developed two different wordlists that can be used with our new system, 
differing primarily in the sentence structure they embody. The first passphrase structure 
is not actually based on any designed sentence structure. Instead, one wordlist is used 
for all of the words in the passphrase. Although different types of words are in the 
wordlist, the permutation of words is not guaranteed or expected to make semantic or 
even grammatical sense; this lack of formal structure matches the majority of existing 
system-generated passphrases. Each of the four words in the passphrase is drawn 
randomly without replacement from the wordlist. 
Users are shown four randomly selected passphrases (e.g., succeed complete 
murder aid, weak parade of chemistry, point local instrument pain, and weigh in jewel 
girl) and are given the opportunity to choose the passphrase out of the four that they 
are most comfortable with. The wordlist used is based on the 1510-word Special English 
list (Kelly, 2010). The exact wordlist was determined through pilot testing to filter out 




entropy; the rationale and calculations behind this decision are covered at the beginning 
of the Method section. 
The second passphrase structure is based on the existing 7-word sentence 
structure from Chapters 3 and 4. The associated wordlist was manually expanded 
beyond 26 animals, 26 adjectives, 26 actions, 26 foods, and so forth. Since English 
speakers know comfortably many more than 26 each of these types of words, we found 
that we were able to maintain the usage of simple words while increasing the level of 
security. In fact, we were even able to eliminate the need for one of the words, resulting 
in a new 6-word sentence structure with varying numbers of possibilities for the 
different word positions. These values were selected to maintain the same 40 bits of 
entropy as the first passphrase structure; these calculations are likewise covered at the 
beginning of the Method section. Again, the exact wordlist was determined through 
pilot testing to screen out problematic words. 
Implementation Considerations 
Shay et al. (2012) determined that roughly 1000 to 2000 words is a reasonable 
size for wordlists for system-generated passphrases. In fact, to avoid reinventing the 
wheel, our original idea for our new system was to reuse the same 1024-word list from 
their paper, derived from the most common words in the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA). A survey of available wordlists found that none of them fit our 
requirements perfectly for system-generated passphrases, although some came closer 




most wordlists and the requirements for a usable passphrase-generating wordlist. Some 
of these concerns, in roughly descending order of importance, include: 
 The wordlist is too large (e.g., Diceware list, Crypt::Diceware). 
 The wordlist is outdated (e.g., Basic English, General Service List). 
 The wordlist is domain-specific (e.g., Business English, Simplified Technical 
English for aerospace, Dolch Word List for children). 
 The wordlist is commercialized, or the methodology behind its construction 
is unclear (e.g., Globish). 
 The wordlist contains American-centric proper nouns (e.g., XKPasswd) or 
British spellings (e.g., Oxford English Corpus list). 
 A wordlist based on the most common words may contain proper nouns, 
abbreviations, and slang (e.g., COCA). It may be especially volatile over time. 
It may also include semantic duplicates that cause interference with one 
another. 
 A wordlist based on teaching English as a second language (e.g., Special 
English, Basic English, General Service List) may contain words that are 
prioritized as being useful to learn – perhaps appearing frequently in news 
articles or travel conversations – rather than simple. 
Taking into account these issues, we decided the best fit was to start with the 
1510-word Special English list (Kelly, 2010). This wordlist was created in 1959 by Voice 




and updated regularly since. It is aimed at international listeners and English learners. As 
stated earlier, pilot testing was conducted to eliminate the more troublesome words. 
An additional benefit of basing our wordlist on the Special English list is that each 
word in the list comes with a simple definition. Our system incorporates these 
definitions as tooltips, so that a user who does not understand a particular word can 
mouse over the word to receive a definition. This proves to be especially helpful since 
our system relies on user-created mnemonic pictures. 
For the decoy-based input masking to function appropriately, the previous 
method of a rotational cipher was changed. In the new system, the decoys come from 
other words in the wordlist. We considered prioritizing the decoy words for each 
legitimate word by selecting decoys that are most similar to the legitimate word. While 
this would possibly increase the security against shoulder surfing, it would also decrease 
the resistance against human guessing, as attackers would be able to begin guessing 
near the similar decoys. 
The fundamental issue here is that the more the decoys are based on the 
passphrase, the more information is leaked during guessing attacks. Even using decoys 
from the same wordlist or sentence structure leaks information about the wordlist or 
sentence structure, but this is considered an acceptable tradeoff. 
If security against camera-based shoulder surfing attacks is instead the top 
priority, our system can be adapted to generate consistent decoys in the same cohort of 




buck, bump, and bust would always result in those three words in the same rows, no 
matter which of the three was typed. This design decision is so an attacker cannot 
record the screen with a camera and later determine which input results in the recorded 
screen. The system can also detect what has been typed so far and identify a shoulder 
surfing attack by noticing an in-progress typed decoy, even if that decoy is never actually 
submitted as a login attempt. The system would then lock out and record the attacker 
and alert the legitimate user of the shoulder surfing attack. 
Maximizing the similarity between decoys would provide better defense against 
shoulder surfers who attempt to look back and forth between the user’s fingers and the 
screen. This system could still defend against intrusion attempts by detecting attacks on 
decoy passphrases and words, but testing would show if the false alarm rate (i.e., 
locking out legitimate users) can remain absolutely at zero. Whereas with the rotational 
cipher, it would be extraordinarily unlikely for a decoy to be accidentally typed, it is 
relatively more feasible that a legitimate user could type buck instead of bump. 
As previously stated, the user-created picture aids were readily integrated into 
the new system without further changes. The user’s interaction with the system has 
changed somewhat, since the generated passphrases are different from the previous 
mnemonic phrases, but the implementation of the system itself remains the same. In 
contrast to complex character-based passwords containing letters, numbers, and 
symbols, the word-based structure of passphrases allows the user to envision a scene or 




There is one last consideration concerning the simultaneous display of 
mnemonic pictures with decoy masking. Since a shoulder surfer could see which of the 
possible decoys best fits the picture, the combination of the two techniques could result 
in a degraded level of security against shoulder surfing attacks. This attack would be 
particularly effective when carefully reviewing a camera recording. To defend against 
this potential vulnerability, we hide the picture by default and allow the user to show 
the picture. The user can still receive memory assistance when necessary (e.g., when 
learning a new passphrase or for less commonly used passphrases), but frequently or 
publicly used passphrases need not always have their picture displayed. 
A final addition to the basic system-generated passphrase system is the idea of 
error correction to reduce typographical errors, also known as automatic spell checking. 
Because the wordlists we use are tremendously smaller than a wordlist found in a word 
processor or web browser, our system is able to correct to the intended word more 
aggressively and accurately. This is accomplished by converting the user’s input to the 
word in the wordlist with the shortest Damerau-Levenshtein distance (the identical 
word in case of a match); the word with the highest Jaro-Winkler similarity is used in 
case of a tie. Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Equation 1) and Jaro-Winkler proximity 
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With our system, if a word in the correct passphrase is bump, then bmup would 
also be accepted. If an attacker is attempting to input a decoy such as bust, close 
typographical errors such as bush should still resolve to the closest word, which is a 
decoy in this case. Because we correct to both legitimate words and decoys with equal 
weight, the security of our new system remains unaffected. 
Method 
Independent Variable 
The goal of this research is to examine the effect of authentication scheme on 
the usability and security of digital authentication. Accordingly, the main independent 
variable in the study is authentication scheme; session is another independent variable, 
but we are only interested in its interaction with authentication scheme, not any main 
effects. 
The following conditions were selected to fulfill 40 bits of entropy, which is a 
commonly used level of security for passwords protecting valuable resources (Biancuzzi, 
2006; Hruska, 2011; Shiner, 2013). The security of the system can then also be enhanced 
through key stretching (i.e., repeated password hashing designed to increase 
computation time) (Percival, 2009). The first two conditions represent the most 
common and recommended currently available passphrase systems, and the last two 





1. A user-generated passphrase of at least 24 characters (including spaces) with 
no other restrictions (see Figure 21). No mnemonics are used, and the input 
masking is standard bullet masking. (                                
                                                  












2. A system-generated passphrase utilizing three words drawn randomly 
without replacement from the Diceware8k list (Reinhold, 2012) 
supplemented with Beale’s alternate list (Reinhold, 2012) and the shortest 
words from the 1Password expanded English Diceware list (Shiner, 2013), 
totaling 10326 unique words (see Figure 22), i.e. “Diceware10k.” No 
mnemonics are used, and the input masking is standard bullet masking. 












3. A passphrase chosen from a set of four system-generated passphrases, each 
utilizing four words drawn randomly without replacement from an abridged 
version of the Special English list (Kelly, 2010) containing 1450 words with 
definition tooltips (see Figure 23). A user-created mnemonic picture is shown 
during login, error correction is enabled, and the input masking is decoy 
masking. (                                            










4. A system-generated passphrase utilizing a 6-word sentence structure based 
on the 7-word structure from Chapters 3 and 4, with an expanded number of 
possible randomly drawn words for each location (see Figure 24). A user-
created mnemonic picture is shown during login, error correction is enabled, 
and the input masking is decoy masking. (    (               












Our study employed both quantitative and qualitative measures. The 
quantitative dependent variables measured the security and usability of the 
authentication schemes. The data for these objective measures were recorded by the 
system: 
 Recall time: seconds taken to either succeed or eventually fail to sign in to an 
account, measured starting from the presentation of the login screen 
 Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) for recall effectiveness, 
shoulder surfing security, and cracking security: the length in edits (total sum 
of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent 
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the guess 
of a passphrase and the actual stored passphrase 
 Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990) for recall effectiveness, shoulder 
surfing security, and cracking security: the similarity or correlation between 
the guess of a passphrase and the actual stored passphrase, normalized such 
that 0 indicates no similarity and 1 indicates equality 
 Recall success: a binary metric of either success or failure to sign in 
 Shoulder surfing resist success: a binary metric of either resisting shoulder 
surfing or failing to do so 
 Cracking resist success: a binary metric of either resisting cracking or failing 




 Cracking resist attempts: the number of attempts taken by a machine to 
crack the passphrase 
It is worth noting that creation time was not included as a dependent variable, 
although we had previously measured creation time in our studies from Chapters 3 and 
4. We stated that the effect of condition on performance could be mediated by creation 
time, but that we also valued the indirect effect of encouraging the user to think more 
deeply during account creation. For this study, we decided to examine the direct effect 
without mediation by standardizing each instance of account creation to five minutes 
each, regardless of the condition. 
These quantitative subjective measures were recorded by the system: 
 Creation and recall NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 
1988) indices addressing mental demand, physical demand, temporal 
demand, performance, effort, and frustration, each on a 7-point Likert scale 
 Creation and recall System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996) scores 
addressing usability, each out of a total of 100 possible points 
 Perceived level of security on a 7-point Likert scale 





Qualitative research was also used to assess the security and usability of the 
authentication schemes. These qualitative subjective measures were collected by the 
researcher: 
 Direct observation of the participant during the experimental tasks 
 Post-test open-ended interview questions about likes, dislikes, suggestions, 
and perceived usability, security, and overall qualities 
Due to the largely internal nature of the tasks, especially during recall, any video 
recordings of participants would be low on visible actions. Therefore, it was decided 
that a retrospective think-aloud protocol would not contribute much additional 
information over direct observation and post-test interview questions. 
Hypotheses 
Prior to conducting the study, we proposed four primary hypotheses: 
1. Recall effectiveness measures will be most favorable for the new system 
conditions (#3 and #4). 
2. Shoulder surfing security measures will not differ between authentication 
schemes. 
3. Cracking security measures will be least favorable overall for the user-
generated passphrase condition (#1). 
4. Subjective usability measures will be least favorable for the Diceware10k 




For the first primary hypothesis, the work from Chapters 3 and 4 indicated that 
mnemonic aids improved recall effectiveness, although the conditions examined were 
all based on system-generated passwords. The decoy masking technique from Chapter 5 
should also reduce the number of errors made during the recall task. Since the new 
system conditions (#3 and #4) integrate techniques designed to improve memorability 
and usability, they should in theory exhibit the highest levels of recall effectiveness: 
lower Damerau-Levenshtein distance, higher Jaro-Winkler proximity, and higher recall 
success. 
For the second primary hypothesis, the work from Chapter 5 indicated that the 
use of decoy masking over conventional bullet masking had no adverse effect on the 
level of security against shoulder surfing, although the study examined randomly 
generated passwords instead of passphrases. The modifications to the decoy masking 
system to support passphrases should preserve this strong level of security in the new 
system conditions (#3 and #4) versus the bullet masking conditions (#1 and #2). We 
expected to see no significant differences in Damerau-Levenshtein distance, Jaro-
Winkler proximity, and resist success for shoulder surfing security. 
For the third primary hypothesis, human attackers would not be expected to 
come close to correctly guessing any legitimate passphrases. Against machine cracking, 
the three system-generated passphrase conditions (#2, #3, and #4) should share similar 
levels of security; each of these conditions is randomly generated and designed to 




generated passphrase condition (#1) is estimated to have 40 bits of entropy. However, 
since users tend to choose patterned, less secure passwords and passphrases, it is still 
probable that the user-generated passphrase condition would exhibit the lowest levels 
of machine cracking security, as measured by lower cracking resist attempts. 
For the fourth primary hypothesis, since users typically prefer to choose their 
own passwords (Proctor et al., 2002), perceived usability would not likely be the lowest 
for the user-generated passphrase condition (#1). When comparing the three system-
generated passphrase conditions, the new system conditions (#3 and #4) integrate 
techniques to improve usability over the Diceware10k system-generated passphrase 
condition (#2). Research has also indicated that the large wordlist size of Diceware 
systems leads to a reduction in usability (Leonhard & Venkatakrishnan, 2007), as 
measured subjectively in our study by recall SUS and overall rating. 
Participants 
We recruited a fairly diverse set of 52 participants (28 males, 24 females), 
ranging from age 20 to 61 (M=29), via word of mouth and e-mail. Fifty of our 
participants returned between 7 and 11 days later for a second session; the other two 
participants were lost to attrition. The 50 participants who returned were each 
compensated with a $20 gift card for completing our study. The study utilized a within-
subject design where each participant received each condition. All participants were 




The number of participants was determined based on a priori power analysis 
using G*Power 3. With conservative estimates of medium effect size for ANOVA (f=.25) 
(Cohen, 1988) and desired power of .95, the required sample size for within-subject 
repeated measures ANOVA is 44. For comparison, using a large effect size for ANOVA 
(f=.40) and desired power of .80 yields a required sample size of 16. We decided on 52 
participants as a sort of buffer (power of .975) and with the knowledge that many study 
designs tend to be underpowered rather than overpowered. 
We considered running this study using Amazon Mechanical Turk, the most 
popular crowdsourcing marketplace. However, there are several factors that make this 
study poorly suited to Mechanical Turk: 
 Most importantly, the shoulder surfing data cannot be collected online and 
must be collected in a laboratory setting. 
 Our implementation of user-created pictures is tightly coupled with the local 
experimental setup to support automatic opening, saving, and closing. 
Because the online drawing apps we found were determined to be poor and 
unfamiliar to our pilot testers, an online replacement would rely on the 
participant creating a picture on his or her own terms and then uploading the 
picture to our server. 
 One of the largest advantages of Mechanical Turk is the rapid collection of 
data. This is greatly neutralized in our study due to the turnaround time 




validity and being able to easily recruit and pay tremendous numbers of 
participants) would still remain. In addition, the turnaround time would lead 
to particularly large levels of attrition when compared to a laboratory study. 
By standardizing each instance of account creation to five minutes, we were 
able to run multiple participants simultaneously in the laboratory, mitigating 
some of the differences in data collection speed. 
Procedure 
Participants were first greeted, given a brief overview of the study, and asked to 
complete an informed consent form. Notably, participants were informed that they 
could be asked not to return for the second session if they violated instructions such as 
not including the passphrase as text in a picture. Each condition of the within-subject 
design was standardized at five minutes per condition, with a one-minute warning given 
after four minutes had elapsed. Upon completing the creation phase for each condition, 
participants were asked to complete NASA-TLX and SUS questionnaires. Once all four 
accounts were created, participants answered some open-ended interview questions 
regarding the account creation task and completed a basic demographic questionnaire; 
because multiple participants were run at the same time, we employed a focus group 
format. The amount of time required to complete the creation phase was approximately 
thirty minutes. 
Participants then moved to the recall phase. One of the four accounts was 




attempts; this process was then repeated for the remaining three accounts. After each 
condition, participants were asked to complete NASA-TLX and SUS questionnaires, this 
time regarding the recall task. Participants were also asked to provide a rating for the 
perceived level of security and an overall assessment. Once all four accounts were 
attempted, participants answered some open-ended interview questions about their 
likes, dislikes, suggestions, and any other relevant opinions in a focus group setting. The 
amount of time required to complete the recall phase was approximately fifteen 
minutes. 
Participants were specifically instructed not to write down their passphrases 
after creating them. A week after each participant’s first session, he or she was invited 
back for a second session to repeat the recall process. These recall tasks took 
approximately fifteen minutes, as before. Participants were asked to return even if they 
failed to recall one or more passphrases in the first session. Although they would be 
unlikely to recall a passphrase that was previously forgotten, we still found it useful to 
measure if their second-session attempt was farther away, the same, or even closer 
than their first-session attempt. 
At the end of the recall phase of the second session, for which the procedure 
was largely identical to the recall phase of the first session, participants were also tasked 
with attempting to guess the passphrases of four other accounts as closely as possible. 




displaying any mnemonic aids, utilizing the same input masking techniques, and 
allowing the same five attempts. 
After attempting to guess the passphrases of other accounts, participants took 
on the role of attackers to assess the security of the conditions against shoulder surfing. 
After observing another user entering his or her passphrase – being allowed during that 
time to see the mnemonic picture if applicable – the attacker was then asked to enter 
the observed text as accurately as possible. The amount of time required to complete 
the guessing and shoulder surfing tasks was approximately fifteen minutes. 
In total, the amount of time required to complete both sessions of the study was 
approximately seventy-five minutes: around forty-five minutes for the first session and 
around thirty minutes for the second session. To combat attrition, the $20 gift cards 
were not distributed until the second session was completed. 
Results 
Data Analysis 
We used SPSS 19 for the data analysis. For the recall measures of time, 
Damerau-Levenshtein distance, Jaro-Winkler proximity, NASA-TLX indices, and SUS 
score, a repeated measures one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval was used to 
determine significance. A one-way ANOVA was used for the appropriate dependent 
variables that were collected only once: creation NASA-TLX, creation SUS, perceived 
security, overall rating, shoulder surfing and cracking Damerau-Levenshtein distance 




means of the control system conditions (#1 and #2) versus the new system conditions 
(#3 and #4) for recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity using t-
tests as a priori planned comparisons, based on our first primary hypothesis. 
Welch’s correction was used when variances were heterogeneous, which was 
determined using Levene’s test. Mauchly’s test was used to check for the assumption of 
sphericity. When sphericity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
applied. Since the recall time did not follow a normal distribution, a log transformation 
was first applied to achieve normality. We also applied a log2 transformation to cracking 
resist attempts to match the scale of entropy bits, in addition to the consideration of 
normality. 
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which authentication schemes 
differed significantly from one another. The Games-Howell test was used in place of 
Tukey’s HSD when variances were heterogeneous. A simple effects test was used to 
evaluate any possible interactions involving condition and session. 
Recall success was analyzed using a generalized estimating equation to examine 
the longitudinal effect across sessions. Shoulder surfing resist success, cracking resist 
success, and individual session recall success were analyzed using a binary logistic 
regression. 
Machine Cracking 
To determine cracking resist attempts, automated cracking was conducted on 




password cracking programs (Rao, Jha, & Kini, 2013). John the Ripper’s wordlist mode 
was used with the largest dictionary provided by the developers. After eight hours of 
cracking on a 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 desktop computer, not a single passphrase was 
identified. 
We then tried John the Ripper’s incremental mode, which uses a Brute-Force 
Markov (BFM) algorithm, as outlined in Kelley et al. (2011). The algorithm was trained 
with the same wordlist, which was used to build a Markov chain (with states and 
probabilistic transitions to subsequent states) for the password space. This Markov 
chain was then followed while cracking. After another eight hours of cracking on the 
same 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 computer, again, not a single passphrase was identified. 
Unsurprisingly, John the Ripper and all the other password crackers currently available 
are known to perform poorly against passphrases (Rao, Jha, & Kini, 2013). 
Finally, we built a simple deterministic passphrase cracker based on word 
frequency analysis, trained on the wordlist derived from the study. This passphrase 
cracker will always first attempt the combination of all the most common words for 
each position, and then proceed to guess the next most likely combination and repeat 
until the entire passphrase space is exhausted. 
For example, if a total of three users selected I love cats, I hate cats, and I love 
dogs as their passphrases, the deterministic cracker would first attempt I love cats 
followed by I love dogs, I hate cats, and I hate dogs. The total number of possible 




all four possibilities in descending likelihood. The specific order is determined because 
love appears more frequently than hate, and cats appears more frequently than dogs. 
Because certain words appear more frequently, passphrases containing these words 
would be considered less secure and would take fewer attempts to crack. Moreover, a 
set of passphrases would be considered less secure, the more overlap there is between 
individual passphrases. 
Typical password crackers are designed to operate on password hashes since 
normally the passwords are unknown. On the other hand, our deterministic passphrase 
cracker can be fed the passphrases and simply calculate the required number of 
attempts without having to iterate through all the individual combinations. At this point, 
the cracking resist attempts could be determined after several minutes of running on 
the 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 computer. 
Objective Measures 
Efficiency. The results indicate a significant difference for first-session recall time 
(F=8.99, p <.001, η2=.087). The recall time in seconds was shorter for Special English 
(M=28.9) than all other conditions, as seen in Figure 25. For the second session, there 
was no significant difference for recall time (F=1.88, p=.138, η2=.025). The average recall 
time in seconds for Special English increased from before (M=44.9) but remained the 
shortest condition. There was no interaction effect of condition and session on recall 






Figure 6.5. 1st-session recall time (smaller values indicate increased efficiency) 
 
Effectiveness. The differences in recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance were 
statistically significant for both the first session (F=4.95, p=.003, η2=.045) and second 
session (F=6.26, p=.001, η2=.077). However, the interaction effect of condition and 
session on Damerau-Levenshtein distance was not significant (F=0.940, p=.422, 
η2=.014). For the first session, Special English (M=0.380) was significantly shorter than 




(M=3.50) was even higher than that of Diceware10k, the greater variance in the User-
generated condition meant that it did not differ significantly from Special English. We 
did observe a significant effect (t=3.05, p=.003, d=.424) when comparing the new 
system conditions (Special English and Sentence: M=0.740) with the control system 
conditions (User-generated and Diceware10k: M=3.37). For the second session, Special 
English (M=2.12) was significantly shorter than both User-generated (M=7.00) and 
Diceware10k (M=7.62). Sentence (M=2.94) was also significantly shorter than 
Diceware10k. These results can be seen in Figure 27. We also found a significant effect 
(t=4.02, p<.001, d=.568) when comparing the new system conditions (M=2.53) with the 













Figure 6.7. 2nd-session Damerau-Levenshtein distance (smaller values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
Likewise, the differences in recall Jaro-Winkler proximity were statistically 
significant for both the first session (F=4.16, p=.008, η2=.059) and second session 
(F=9.96, p<.001, η2=.147). Recall Jaro-Winkler proximity was strongly correlated with 
Damerau-Levenshtein distance for both the first session (r=-.834, p<.001) and second 
session (r=-.834, p<.001). Again, the interaction effect of condition and session on Jaro-




Special English (M=.990) and Sentence (M=.985) were both closer than Diceware10k 
(M=.898), as seen in Figure 28. We also found a significant effect (t=-3.47, p=.001, 
d=.481) when comparing the new system conditions (M=.988) with the control system 
conditions (M=.911). For the second session, Special English (M=.956) and Sentence 
(M=.955) were again both closer than Diceware10k (M=.764), as seen in Figure 29. 
There was also a significant effect (t=-5.23, p<.001, d=.739) when comparing the new 














Figure 6.9. 2nd-session Jaro-Winkler proximity (larger values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
As with the other recall effectiveness measures, the effect of passphrase on 
success was also determined to be statistically significant for both the first session 
(χ2=20.4, p<.001) and second session (χ2=36.0, p<.001). There was no significant 
interaction effect of condition and session on recall success (χ2=1.19, p=.275). Figure 30 
shows that the first-session success rate was 94.2% for Special English, 92.3% for 




the second-session success rate was 82.0% for Sentence, 80.0% for Special English, 
50.0% for User-generated, and 34.0% for Diceware10k. Significance was also found 
when examining system type (control or new) instead of condition for both the first 
session (χ2=18.5, p<.001) and the second session (χ2=33.3, p<.001). 
 
 







Figure 6.11. 2nd-session recall success rate (larger values indicate increased effectiveness) 
 
Security. There was a statistically significant difference for the Damerau-
Levenshtein distance between the shoulder surfers’ guesses and the actual passwords 
(F=43.0, p<.001, η2=.397). As shown in Figure 32, Sentence (M=30.5) was longer than 
User-generated (M=23.0) and Special English (M=19.9), and all three conditions were 
longer than Diceware10k (M=9.68). It is worth emphasizing that longer passphrases 




unrelated. When looking instead at Jaro-Winkler proximity, as seen in Figure 33, there 
was no significant effect (F=2.14, p=.097, η2=.032). However, Jaro-Winkler proximity did 
correlate with Damerau-Levenshtein distance (r=-.518, p<.001). No passphrase was 











Figure 6.13. Shoulder surfing Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security) 
 
For cracking security against human attackers, there was a statistically significant 
difference for the Damerau-Levenshtein distance between adversaries’ guesses and the 
actual passwords (F=43.4, p<.001, η2=.399). As seen in Figure 34, Sentence (M=31.5) and 
User-generated (M=28.3) were both farther than Special English (M=20.8), and all three 




significant difference for the Jaro-Winkler proximity, which correlated with Damerau-
Levenshtein distance (r=-.518, p<.001), between guesses and the actual passwords 
(F=19.5, p<.001, η2=.230). For Jaro-Winkler proximity, Diceware10k (M=.404) and User-
generated (M=.457) were farther than both Special English (M=.568) and Sentence 
(M=.589), as seen in Figure 35. Again, no passphrase was guessed correctly, so the 
cracking resist success rate was 100% for all passphrases. 
 
 







Figure 6.15. Cracking Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security) 
 
For cracking security against machine attackers, the effect of passphrase on the 
log2-transformed cracking resist attempts was found to be statistically significant 
(F=78.1, p<.001, η2=.632). Special English (M=36.0), Sentence (M=34.6), and 




of attempts to crack on average than did the User-generated condition (M=23.8). This 







Figure 6.16. log2-transformed cracking resist attempts (larger values indicate increased security) 
 
Subjective Measures 
Workload. For the creation task, there was no significant effect of condition on 
any of the NASA-TLX indices: mental demand (F=1.37, p=.253, η2=.020), physical 
demand (F=2.39, p=.070, η2=.034), temporal demand (F=2.40, p=.069, η2=.034), 
performance (F=1.31, p=.272, η2=.019), effort (F=2.04, p=.109, η2=.029), and frustration 




statistically significant was mental demand (F=3.44, p=.019, η2=.049). Special English 
(M=2.29) was rated as being less mentally demanding than Diceware10k (M=3.60). For 
the second recall session, there was no significant effect of condition on any of the 
indices, including mental demand (F=2.178, p=.092, η2=.032), which was now rated at 
M=3.44 for Special English. In addition, there was no interaction effect of condition and 
session on any of the NASA-TLX indices. 
Usability. During the creation task, there was no significant effect of condition 
on SUS (F=1.50, p=.216, η2=.022), as seen in Figure 37. For first-session recall, the effect 
of condition on SUS was significant (F=4.29, p=.007, η2=.058). Figure 38 shows that 
Special English (M=72.9) was rated as more usable than Diceware10k (M=59.9) and 
User-generated (M=58.0). As seen in Figure 39, the effect of condition on SUS was also 
significant for second-session recall (F=7.62, p<.001, η2=.110). Sentence (M=76.0) and 
Special English (M=71.7) were both considered more usable than User-generated 
(M=56.0). Sentence was also found to be significantly more usable than Diceware10k 



























Security. There was no significant difference for the effect of condition on 







Figure 6.20. Perceived security on a 7-point Likert scale (larger values indicate increased security) 
 
Overall. There was a significant difference for the effect of condition on overall 
rating (F=9.73, p<.001, η2=.130), as seen in Figure 41. Special English (M=5.02), Sentence 











Our first primary hypothesis, that recall effectiveness measures would be most 
favorable for the new system conditions, was supported by the results. This was the 
case when comparing between conditions and also when comparing control and new 




Sentence, 80% for Special English, 50% for User-generated, and 34% for Diceware10k) 
were somewhat higher than expected, given our results from previous studies in 
Chapters 3 and 4 on passwords and mnemonics. 
Nevertheless, success rates around 80% would not initially seem to inspire 
tremendous confidence in the practicality of real-world implementation. However, for 
the sake of experimental design, we intended for our tasks to be more difficult than in 
typical scenarios. Participants were tasked to create four accounts in a row (resulting in 
interference between passphrases), could not write down or practice their passphrases, 
and were not incentivized for higher performance. Therefore, we believe that in 
standard real-world situations, long-term success rates for our new system would 
increase past the 80% level. 
For the control system conditions, our finding that the success rates were 
somewhat higher than expected was likely due to the controls in this study being a bit 
more memorable than the previous control condition of passwords generated with 
random letters. For the new system conditions, higher success rates were likely due in 
large part to the login benefits of error correction and decoy masking. There were also 
fewer words to remember with the new system conditions than with the previous 7-
word sentence structure. 
Our second primary hypothesis, that shoulder surfing security measures would 
not differ between authentication schemes, was also supported by the results. Although 




largely due to the differences in length between passphrases. (Regardless, the fact that 
our new system results in longer passphrases is a valid contributor to increased security 
against shoulder surfing combined with machine attack.) Because of the need for a 
length-independent baseline, Jaro-Winkler proximity was a more useful measure, and it 
showed no significant differences between conditions. This indicates that the shoulder 
surfing security of decoy masking was preserved through the transition from passwords 
to passphrases. 
Our third primary hypothesis was that cracking security measures would be least 
favorable overall for User-generated, which we argue was also borne out by the results. 
For cracking security against human attackers, the Jaro-Winkler proximity indicated that 
User-generated and Diceware10k performed better than Special English and Sentence; 
in other words, the mnemonic pictures leaked some information to attackers. However, 
the average proximity for all conditions fell between .4 and .6. These values are not very 
high, and the new system conditions were indeed far closer to the guesses of the 
control system conditions than insecurity. To put it in another perspective, attackers 
came closer to guessing the legitimate passphrase while shoulder surfing with the bullet 
masking of the control system conditions than they did while guessing passphrases 
based on the pictures of the new system conditions. Moreover, due to the nature of 
passphrases, the closest by Damerau-Levenshtein distance that any attacker got to a 
legitimate passphrase was farther away than the entire password length in our previous 




For cracking security against machine attackers, User-generated was found to 
take 224 attempts on average, over 10 bits less secure than any other condition. (Since 
the entire passphrase space will only be exhausted by machine guessing in the worst 
case scenario, and because all possible passphrases are far from equally likely, this does 
not mean that User-generated was found to exhibit 24 bits of entropy.) Although this 
effect is extremely significant from a statistical standpoint, and over 1000 times fewer 
attempts required also seems significant from a practical standpoint, we cannot say with 
absolute certainty that the difference matters at this point in time. 
For the fourth primary hypothesis, that subjective usability measures would be 
least favorable for Diceware10k, the results were different than expected. While 
Diceware10k did indeed perform worse than the new system conditions for first-session 
and second-session recall SUS, User-generated performed just as poorly. This was 
surprising to us because users typically prefer to create their own passwords or 
passphrases (Proctor et al., 2002). Since there were no significant differences for 
creation SUS, it is likely that recall SUS was highly affected by lower performance for the 
control system conditions in the recall tasks. While Shay et al. (2012) found that 
participants generally rated system-generated passphrases as difficult and annoying, we 
believe that the mnemonic pictures, error correction, and decoy masking in our new 
systems improved their usability. 
It came as no surprise to us that we found no significant differences for 




understand the underlying implications of various design decisions on security. 
Interestingly, Diceware10k did perform the worst in an overall rating that combined 
usability and security. User-generated outperformed Diceware10k for the overall rating, 
even though they performed at the same level for creation SUS, recall SUS, and 
perceived security. Perhaps this is because, while participants could not process their 
greater dislike for Diceware10k in terms of specific dimensions such as usability and 
security, they did feel that they disliked it the most, overall. 
Observations 
We directly observed a wide range of reactions from participants, demonstrating 
the effect of individual differences. Some participants were smiling and laughing the 
entire time, while others appeared to take the experimental tasks very seriously or 
became frustrated more easily. From what we could tell, these differences were mostly 
unrelated to success at the experimental tasks and were more likely related to 
personality. 
There was a good deal of uniformity in passphrase creation strategy for the user-
generated condition, even though the only requirement was to be at least 24 characters 
in length. All accounts were created using true phrases (e.g., unlike 
Samantha1234567890!!!!!!). The vast majority of user-created passphrases included 
spaces between words. Symbols, numbers, and upper case letters were almost never 
used; when they were, they would inevitably be capitalized first words or proper nouns, 




intentional misspellings or letter-to-number obfuscations (e.g., 0 instead of o). But 
overall, participants jumped at the opportunity to create an authentication secret with 
the simplicity of plain language. 
One participant selected a phrase in a foreign language, and another strung 
together four names that are not commonly seen in the United States. While these may 
have been admirable attempts to bolster security, passphrase crackers can be trained 
on foreign phrases and names just as simply as English ones. Any additions past plain 
English, such as capitalization, punctuation, and letter-to-number obfuscations, are 
particularly poor from both usability and security perspectives, as they introduce extra 
information that must be remembered, but these additions tend to be easy for 
passphrase crackers to predict. 
Other participants selected phrases based on movie quotations, song lyrics, and 
online memes. These insecure selections typically occur when users are allowed to 
select their own phrases (Kuo et al., 2006). While Kuo et al. (2006) found that 65% of 
user-generated passphrases in their study were found when submitted as exact quotes 
to Google, this held for 42% of our user-generated passphrases. In any case, this idea 
suggests the possibility of preventing users from creating passphrases that appear in an 
online search. 
In contrast to passphrase creation, picture creation strategies proved to be 
diverse. Most participants started drawing relatively quickly, but some adopted a 




beginning to draw. The pictures themselves demonstrated a mix of black and white, 
colors, shapes, symbols, freeform, text or letters (not taken directly from the 
passphrase), and different levels of artistry or drawing ability (or more charitably, 
abstractness). Some tried to paint a holistic picture, while others depicted distinct sub-
pictures for individual words in sequence. Participants also finished at different times. 
Some were completely finished before the one-minute warning and spent the rest of 
the allotted time looking at their picture. Others used the entire five minutes and had to 
be explicitly told to stop drawing. 
When it came time to guess the passphrases of other accounts, participants 
almost universally seemed amused or exasperated at the task. We made sure to stress 
that we did not expect anyone to be able to completely guess another passphrase, even 
with picture support. Some participants were quite excited to guess others’ pictures and 
laughed or said they were cute but had no idea what they were supposed to be. 
Participants mostly exhibited similar reactions of exasperation when asked to 
shoulder surf, although several participants claimed they caught part of an entered 
passphrase, usually with decoy masking. A few participants even claimed they thought 
they might have caught the whole thing, but as no passphrase was correctly guessed, 
the results did not support any of these claims. 
We also observed that the defense against shoulder surfing seemed to have 
more to do with the person typing than with the attacker. Behaviors such as pausing 




create potential opportunities for attack. This is why we instructed participants to 
prioritize speed over accuracy while using decoy masking, reminding them of the built-in 
error correction. 
We noticed several different deducible reasons why participants would fail to 
sign in successfully, rather than simply forgetting entirely. Many participants expressed 
disbelief that they had, in particular, forgotten the passphrase they had previously 
chosen. Memory is fallible, which is why mnemonic aids are so valuable. 
For user-generated passphrases, sometimes it was as simple as neglecting an 
exclamation point at the end, leaving out the at the beginning of a phrase, mixing one 
and 1, forgetting capitalization, or making a typographical error. In this last case, since 
the user doesn’t realize the mistake, he or she will try incorrect variations of the 
legitimate passphrase on subsequent attempts, proceeding down a cycle of failure. 
Besides the typographical errors, these other types of mistakes suggest that from an 
information processing perspective, the memory failure was possibly due to an 
encoding error rather than a retrieval error. 
Since we did not ask participants to confirm their passphrases during creation, 
we thought that perhaps some users might have made a typographical error during 
creation instead of login. However, when we examined the passphrases, we noticed 
that this phenomenon only occurred for one participant. Interestingly, a couple of 
participants intentionally introduced a misspelling into a passphrase and successfully 




For Diceware10k, unfamiliar words were troublesome. Symbol-based “words” 
also caused difficulty, and participants would also forget the order of the words. 
Unsurprisingly, the single most common reason why participants had trouble with this 
condition was simply that they were assigned a randomly generated passphrase without 
any mnemonic aids. 
For the new system conditions, because of the mnemonic pictures, participants 
very rarely experienced a complete inability to remember any aspect of the passphrase. 
Participants were frequently off by one word, substituting another word with a similar 
meaning. For the sentence-based passphrase, the animal and the food tended to be 
easier to remember, while the food adjective and verb tended to give the most 
problems. This same pattern also held for attackers’ guesses of pictures. 
Responses 
One of the most consistent statements from participants answering the open-
ended interview questions was just how much they enjoyed taking part in the study, 
compared to other studies they had participated in. Several participants exclaimed that 
they were going to go home and play a game of Pictionary. Another responded that the 
Sentence passphrase condition reminded him of the Apples to Apples card game, based 
on intriguing or unexpected word combinations; others compared the condition to Mad 
Libs. 
While participants almost unanimously liked the mnemonic pictures, perhaps the 




Participants felt relieved that they did not have to type their passphrase absolutely 
correctly, although some felt the need to correct their mistakes regardless. Sometimes, 
we observed users making a mistake and never realizing it; without error correction, 
they would have failed the login attempt and not understand why they had failed. 
Participants also expressed a great deal of appreciation for decoy masking. This 
was demonstrated primarily not during the decoy masking tasks but during the standard 
bullet masking tasks, as the lack of feedback in those cases proved frustrating. Several 
participants particularly liked how the color and position of the legitimate entry was 
consistent for every recall task for a particular passphrase. 
Another potentially underappreciated feature of our new system was allowing 
participants a choice of four passphrases for Special English. Some participants 
remarked that they liked having the feeling of choice in that condition rather than 
simply the luck of the draw as in the other system-generated conditions. 
The passphrase scheme that participants disliked the most was Diceware10k. 
There was certainly the highest degree of variance in assigned or created passphrases 
with this condition, as the system could randomly assign three easy words or three 
difficult words. Naturally, participants who received words that they did not recognize 
professed a major dislike for the system; a few participants wondered why there 
couldn’t have been definition tooltips for this condition rather than for Special English, 
where the definitions weren’t typically needed. Participants also disliked how symbol 




importantly, participants disliked that no mnemonic picture was available for this 
condition. 
The single most insightful suggestion from a participant was an enhancement to 
strengthen the phrase-based decoy masking when a typographical error has been made 
that the system has not yet corrected. In this situation, the system would also introduce 
a typographical error in the decoys and then correct all lines of displayed text 
simultaneously. The system would know what the correct passphrase is, and while it 
would not be desirable to correct all errors immediately (or else it would be impossible 
for an attacker to fail during login), the proposed idea should be feasible. 
Later, however, we realized that this change would likely be insecure against 
passphrase guessers, as an attacker could simply try each character one letter at a time 
until identifying the correct character as the one that does not induce a typographical 
error in the decoys. The threat of this type of attack could possibly be mitigated by 
detecting if an attacker is employing this tactic and then locking the account, but 
legitimate users may then be caught in the crossfire. Along with the consideration of 
selecting decoys similar to the legitimate passphrase, these examples demonstrate that 
there is often a tradeoff not only between usability and security, but also between 
security measures against different types of attacks. 
Finally, several participants noted that getting to play the role of an attacker was 
both fun and informative. A few participants suggested that this new perspective would 





We developed a new authentication system based on passphrases instead of 
passwords. Our new system incorporates a user-generated mnemonic picture displayed 
during login, definition tooltips, error correction to reduce typographical errors, a 
decoy-based input masking technique, and the choice of utilizing either a specialized 
wordlist or a sentence template. The idea is that these added features work particularly 
well with passphrases and help to address the usability shortcomings that have slowed 
the adoption of passphrases. 
We conducted a study to evaluate our new system with a customized 1450-word 
list and our new system with a 6-word sentence structure against the control conditions 
of a user-created passphrase of at least 24 characters and a system-generated 
passphrase using a 10326-word list. We found that using the new system conditions, 
memorability was improved and security was equivalent to or better than the control 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The major contribution of our research to the field of digital authentication is in 
facilitating a transition from passwords to usable passphrases, resulting in increased 
security and, potentially, usability. The key lies in addressing the traditional usability 
issues of passphrases, which have hindered wider adoption. This was accomplished 
through the integration of passphrases with our component innovations: a specialized 
wordlist and sentence template, definition tooltips, user-generated mnemonic pictures 
for recall, error correction while typing, and a decoy-based input masking technique. 
We recommend that current authentication systems be steadily adapted to our 
research contributions and findings. In computer security, drastic changes should never 
happen overnight, but regular progress is always necessary. Altogether, our 
contributions represent individual techniques for optimizing usability and security, but 
one practical takeaway is that careful thought and inventive ideas can overcome 
obstacles in the constantly evolving area of computer security. As new challenges will 
always arise, we must be willing to face these challenges with an open mind. 
One topic for future work is separating out which aspects of our new system 
contribute the most beneficial effects. However, several different aspects of our new 
system would be difficult or infeasible to integrate with existing passphrase schemes. 
For example, mnemonic pictures are only effective when the meanings of those words 
are well known. Error correction only works well when the components of a passphrase 




bun and bin would not be desirable to correct to one another, as they are too similar). 
Still, knowing what the more or less significant features are would help us to improve 
them and integrate them into a more effective combination. 
Another interesting research angle would be to break down the entire range of 
memory failures into its component pieces: encoding errors, storage errors, and 
retrieval errors. By examining the different ways in which users can fail to recall their 
passphrases, we can better understand how to provide specially tailored mnemonic aids 
that help them remember those passphrases or other security information. 
Studying performance in the wild versus in a laboratory setting would also be 
important for assessing ecological validity. It may be possible to conduct studies of real 
accounts, over long time periods, or using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In this situation, we 
could also measure how much time users would really spend on account creation or 
login if left to their own devices. More rigorous research into how users actually create 
real passphrases would also have benefits in understanding passphrase memorability 
and security. 
We can also work on developing more sophisticated methods of passphrase 
cracking to better evaluate the security of passphrase systems. Not much attention has 
been given yet to passphrase cracking because the vast majority of authentication 
secrets in the wild are currently passwords, not passphrases. As the situation changes in 




Our final consideration is especially interesting from a user experience 
standpoint: how to foster understanding of best practice using our new system or any 
other novel innovations in computer security. As system designers, how do we prevent 
users from defeating the security features imposed or suggested by the system? This is a 
classic question in human factors research, and part of the answer could involve 
training, motivation, or simply understanding some of the reasons why users behave the 
way they do regarding computer security. 
Our research presents innovative techniques that improve on the usability and 
security of existing authentication systems. We feel that further development of these 
techniques will lead to even greater improvements in the future. In the end, we hope 
that by focusing attention on the usability of security-critical computer systems, we will 
inspire other researchers and practitioners to strive to design systems that are both 
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